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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the thesis that the policies, procedures and practices 
which form the basis of interaction between a quasi-independent agency and the 
executive and bureaucratic arms of government have been established in an ad 
hoc fashion. These "administrative relationships" are not based on an accurate 
and complete body of knowledge about agencies; therefore, accountability is not 
as effective as it could be. 
Case studies are presented of six agencies -- a major revenue-generating 
corporation, a council established to dellver a grants program, a licensing body, 
a quasi-Judicial board, an organization designed to hear appeals and a group with 
an advisory role. Interviews were conducted with the purpose of collecting 
enough data about how agencies operate, and the environment within which they 
function, so as to form general recommendations which could reasonably apply to 
other agencies. 
Eight recommendations have been developed, covering areas such as: annual 
reports, evaluation, accountability, administrative policies, legislative drafting, 
disestablishing agencies, orientation of appointees and on-going research 
activities. 
Finally, the paper provides an acknowledgement that it is individuals --
politicians, bureaucrats. appointed members and members of the public -- who 
really shape agencies. It is to these people to whom we must look for an 
appropriate ·set of relationships" rather than to exaggerate the attempt to find 
administrative relationships which cohere to alt agencies. 
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CHAPTER l 
INTRODUCTION 
This study is conducted from the perspective of a practitioner in the 
provincial civil service who is responsible for the development of 
government-wide administrative systems designed to meet a number of needs, 
sometimes conflicting. Of primary importance is that administrative policies 
and procedures facilitate the timely dispatch of government business in a 
cost-effective and efficient manner. A requirement of equal significance is that 
they contribute to an effective accountability regime. Administrative systems 
must satisfy the notion of fairness, partly through consistency of application, but 
they must also incorporate enough flexibility so that departmental delivery of 
government programs is not adversely affected. This final requirement means 
that the creation of administrative systems must not impair the manager in his 
or her rightful exercise of decision-making authority, or absolve the manager of 
responsibility for the outcomes of those decisions. 
These particular characteristics of administrative policy reflect multiple 
and sometimes incompatible goals. It is difficult enough to balance these 
requirements in the most familiar of all administrative units - the department, 
but it is even more difficult when there is an "arm's length" relationship such as 
is the case with appointed boards, commissions, committees and coeporatlons, ie: 
non-departmental "agencies." 1 This arm's length feature of agencies, which is 
beneficial in some respects, increases the difficulties in developing effective 
administrative policies and procedures. 
As frustrating and cumbersome as central management policies and 
procedures may at times be to the departmental official, at least the purpose of 
such policies, primarily the intent to ensure accountability, is for the most part 
understood and perceived to be legitimate. There is a recognition (sometimes a 
reluctant admission) of the value of consistency, cost control rules and policies 
and procedures which promote accountability. 
When quasi-independent agencies are considered, however, the picture 
immediately clouds. We know that there still exists a requirement for 
accountability, but these agencies have been deliberately distanced from the 
political and bureaticratic arms of government. The standard accountability 
requirements appropriate for departments, may not be so for non-departmental 
agencies. The existence of a Board of Directors usually means that agency staff 
may relate quite differently to the Minister than do departmental officials, and 
there is usually less involvement of the bureaucracy's central agencies In the 
affairs of the non-departmental body. Even where there are strong reporting 
mechanisms to a Minister, the workload of most elected officials Is often too 
heavy for a detailed scrutiny of agency activities. When this is the case, there 
cannot be much meaningful accountability to the Legislature and ultimately to 
the public since even basic questions cannot easily be answered. This situation, 
combined with an awareness that some independence is required, contributes to a 
perception that accountability in quasi-Independent agencies is an area which is 
greatly in need of attention. 
Before proceeding further, a number of terms used throughout this study 
should be defined. The term "administrative relationship". refers to the 
eollection of policies, procedures and practices which are the basis of Interaction 
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between an agency and the executive and bureaucratic arms of government. Of 
particular interest are those policies and procedures which may be applicable to 
more than one agency and which also have implications for an accountability 
system. 
A second term is "government". In some contexts. "government" refers 
solely to the executive or elected (political) sector: and where that is the case, 
the term used is "executive government" or "political arm". Where "government" 
means the bureaucracy, that is so stated. On occasion, the distinction between 
the executive and bureaucratic arms is obvious enough so as to not require 
clarification. In other cases, to make a distinction ls not important, because the 
concept .of bureaucracy used thoughout this study assumes that its function Is to 
implement the policies and decisions of the executive government: in that sense 
they are "one". The argument that politicians are in reality controlled by the 
civil service, or that there ls no one really at the helm (ie: things happen as a 
result of a kind of automatic bureaucratic momentum), must be debated in some 
other study. 
In theoretical terms, the Legislature is the most significant part of the 
governing process since it is there that accountability is ultimately sought. As 
perhaps the kingpin in an effective accountability system, It is through the 
Legislature that Ministers directly and appointed officials indirectly are deemed 
to be held answerable to the public. While acknowledging the crucial role of the 
Legislature, to include an examination of it would create a task far beyond the 
scope of this study. The terms of reference of this study have, therefore, been 
limited to an exploration of that dimension in the accountability system which is 
lar<;1ely administrative In nature, Involving relationships between agencies and 
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the executive and bureaucratic arms of government. 
The most striking factors which contribute to the dlfficulty in clarifying the 
administrative relationships of agencies are their diversity and numbers which 
must be taken into account. Manitoba alone has created over 200 
quasi-independent bodies. Their tasks range from the high-profile 
responsibilities of Manitoba Hydro to those of quasi-judicial agencies like the 
Horse Racing Commission and the Manitoba Labour Board to those of the 
Advisory Committees on Apprenticed Trades. Organizational structure may also 
be variable, as well as their significance to the public purse both as a generator 
of revenue and as a body with the authority to spend. 
Prior to presenting detail on the terms of reference of this study, a brief 
summary of the literature in this area will be provided. Although the body of 
literature ls not extensive, the range of topics ls broad. It can. however, be 
grouped under four main perspectives. While there is some overlap of concems 
and solutions, this grouping is a useful tool in reviewing the literature, and it 
provides a background to the approach taken in this study. 
The first such grouping is based on economic considerations. Here, we find 
that regulation is the key issue, due to the tremendous impact it can have on a 
sector of the economy. But, as the instances of regulatory intervention increase, 
so does external control over more and more aspects of our lives, and many 
writers have pointed out that the affects of regulation are far-reaching and not 
just limited to an economic impact. 
The concerns over regulation have been summarized as being: cost (mainly 
financial, although restricting individual freedom may also be viewed as a cost): 
the conferring of rights (eg: a license) which could be difficult to withdraw: 
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accountability of the arm's length agencies created to do the regulating: and the 
possible "capture" of the agency by the industry it is intended to regulate. 2 
Other literature in the field of regulation is premised on the idea that we 
are over-regulated. Individuals and business are burdened with and restricted by 
regulations which are no longer, or never were. required. Most of these works 
prescribe some degree of regulatory reform, but many argue that complete 
de-regulation, or privatization, is the only solution. 3 
A second broad perspective in the literature focusses on the legal review of 
administrative actions. Most of this work has been undertaken by the Law 
Reform Commissions of Canada and the provinces. The concerns expressed in 
this portion of the literature have to do with the procedural fairness of 
agencies. It is often argued that processes are not always consistent and often 
there is not an adequate system to appeal decisions made by agencies. , 
Many agencies have far-reaching mandates with considerable impact on 
individuals, but due to the arm's length relationship, the usual accountability 
mechanisms involving the answerabillty of the Mlnister to the public through the 
Legislature are seen to be inadequate. The literature in this area does not tend 
to point out that if an effective accountability system were in place, most of the 
problems related to due process could be resolved. Rather, an expanded role for 
the courts is suggested as the appropriate remedial action. 
The recommendations of the various Law Reform Commissions to deal with 
these problems would, if implemented, result in more formal, detailed and public 
(to some extent) proceedings. Decisions of agencies could be appealed to the 
courts. It is argued that if these recommendations were implemented, the affect 
would be to ensure fair (ie: consistent) treatment, to guard against the "capture" 
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of a regulatory body by an industry and to improve accountability. 
Recommendations to place greater reliance upon the courts to ensure 
fairness and accountability of independent administrative agencies have met 
with several criticisms. The largest benefit may be to the legal profession, as 
the primary outcome would be an eKpanded role for the courts. In addition. 
formalized. court-like proceedings are costly and may be intimidating and 
confusing to most of the public. The process could be administratively 
cumbersome, thereby negating one of the often-cited rationales for using a 
non-departmental body, that of enabling greater operational flexibility. 4 
A third body of literature is concerned with the Legislature (or Parliament. 
federally) and its various components - Ministers, other Members, both 
back-benchers and the Opposition, and legislative committees. Typically, 
attention is centered on the role, structure and procedures of these institutions. 
The concern here is to enhance accountability of independent and 
semi-independent agencies to the people's representatives. More specific topics 
include: the nature and extent of reporting to the Minister; the issuance of policy 
directives: and the budgetary approval process. These specific topics are 
included in this portion of the literature because they are items which involve 
the Legislature and are not confined to the executive arm of government, nor do 
they necessarily involve diSc:ussions of the bureaucratic arm. 5 
The final perspective found in the literature addresses the role and place of 
agencies within the system and structure of the executive and bureaucratic arms 
of government. In this group, we find efforts to identify and to classify the wide 
variety of agencies as a preliminary step to the development of an appropriate 
accountability system. Some typologies prescribe the degree to which agencies 
. '• 
x-; 
-7-
shall adhere to the administrative policies and procedures applicable to 
departments. The relationship between the Minister and a non-departmental 
body for which he or she is responsible is also discussed. The appropriate form of 
control is often a topic. Some authors have been concerned w\th the rationale 
for choosing this form to accomplish a public policy goal over other methods. 
The desire to improve accountability ls the usual motivation behind these· 
studies. The resulting classification systems are based on a variety of criteria, 
including: degree of financial dependence on the Consolidated Fund; level of 
responsibility; primary function: need for operational flexibility and so on. The 
resulting typologies are matched to specified ranges of remuneration, auditing 
requirements and/or to schedules of mandatory administrative policies. Many of 
these systems or regimes have been developed by public administrators and vary 
considerably in sophistication and scope. The Federal Government, as well as 
the provinces of Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Ontario have all developed 
typologies which contribute to an accountability system to at least a small 
extent.6 
A frequent criticism is that many of these regimes are based on an 
assumption that greater control of quasi-independent agencies is required. an 
assumption which is not defended or justified. Little, if any, description of the 
experience and problems of.quasi-independent agencies is presented in these 
works to support the assumption. One can only concede the point made by John 
Langford, 7 who suggests that the greater control measures put forward by public 
administrators are primarily a knee-jerk reaction, rather than a well-thought out 
position based on astute observation and an analysis of the facts. Greater 
control may well be justified, but it must be based on thorough study • 
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While the pre-occupation with accountability for agencies may be justified. 
and although the response to this concern may have merit, it does not spring 
from an understanding of the complexities of quasi-independent agencies nor of 
the administrative policies which reflect an inter-locking set of relationships 
intrinsic to effective accountability. The accountability requirements proven to 
be appropriate for departments have been assumed to be appropriate for other 
administrative forms. What we have tended to see regardlng the treatment of 
agencies has been a "reining-lo"; the imposition of greater control in the 
traditional ways. Greater control regimes have been the primary policy output 
of the bureaucracy, as if they were a panacea. It is clear then, that an initial 
step out of the "more control" morass is to develop a more well-rounded 
understanding of agencies. 
In this study. an attempt will be made to look at a broad range of agency 
experiences - not just their interaction with the bureaucracy and specifically its 
central agencies, but also with other aspects of their environment (the policy 
field, the public, the market, etc.), the effect of organizational structure and the 
impact of using the quasi-independent agency as the tool to accomplish a public 
goal. Perhaps this approach can produce guidelines which better reflect the 
conflicting needs of independence and accountability. 
The issues related to the relationship of these agencies to the Legislature 
will not be addressed, partly because of the need to limit the scope of this study, 
but also because such an examination has less immediate practical application to 
a central management agency within the bureaucracy, and practical 
considerations have been the primary impetus for this study. 
One of the biggest motivations for wanting to tackle this problem in a 
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systematic way is that the considerable diversity among non-departmental 
agencies makes generalizations at least unwise, if not impossible. It is not a 
question of merely preferring an orderly look at things - that motivation can 
only be partially justified; but a systematic view is a requirement if treatment of 
agencies is to be fair. consistent and justifiable. Certainly, this study Is not 
based on the expectation that all problems can be answered, but rather that 
steps can be taken to improve the present situation. At the very minimum, 
efforts directed towards this problem can increase the knowledge which forms 
the base for a more responsible position on the issue of accountability as it 
relates to quasi-independent agencies. 
Much of the work done on regime building for purposes of ensuring 
accountability, although necessary and useful, has largely been based on a narrow 
range of factors. For example, the work done in Ontario places a heavy 
emphasis on only a few characteristics: (l) the degree of dependency on the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund, (2) demonstration of a need to operate outside the 
central management practices and procedures established by Management Board: 
CS) degree of dependency on administrative support services of a ministry or 
department: and (4) the requirement that staff possess specialized expertise not 
normally found in government. 8 
Saskatchewan has classified its agencies into one of three broad categories 
based on relative levels of responsibility of the agencies. These three categories 
- high, medium and moderate - are broad, general groupings without 
well-defined criteria. The meaning of •1evel of responsibility• in the 
Saskatchewan scheme is not clear, but it is likely that the intent was to indicate 
various levels of scope or the extent of an agency's impact. The categories 
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are used to provide some consistency of remuneration (there is some variation 
within categories) to appointees of agencies with roughly comparable levels of 
responsibility. 9 
Literature specific to Manitoba non-departmental agencies is limited and 
deficient. Accountability has been addressed in a general sense, but a thorough 
analysis relative to agencies is lacking. One exception is a study conducted in 
1968-69 as part of a task force on productivity. 10 This study provided useful 
definitions of the approximately 100 {at the time) "non-departmental units" and 
produced some recommendations directed towards those who may be responsible 
for establishing these bodies. These very general recommendations cover control 
nomenclature; role, objectives and terms of reference. 
Other work on Manitoba quasi-independent agencies from within 
govemment involved the attempts to establish a uniform and more equitable 
level of remuneration for the appointed members to these bodies. These efforts 
resulted in a classification of agencies according to criteria thought to be 
important considerations in the establishment of remuneration. 11 
, This classification of Manitoba agencies relies greatly on the level of 
responsibility as the main criterion for remuneration purposes. It does, however, 
also group agencies according to their primary function. While this classification 
was intended to assist in resolving the question of remuneration, it is useful as a 
starting point for purposes of this study. 
Methodology 
The factors which shape the way quasi-independent agencies are 
accountable in practice are multiple. They may be political, legislative, 
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administratively expedient, cultural traditions, industry norms, market place 
e1dgencies or a result of personalities, skill and experience of those involved. 
This being the case. the approach in this study is to examine individually a 
number of agencies and to develop an understanding of the circumstances which 
have relevance to the "administrative relationship" as defined earlier in this 
study. 
Since the number of case studies presented here must be limited, an 
overview of three groupings or categories of agencies will be provided prior to 
the case studies from each category. The overview is intended to assist in 
"rounding out the picture". This is important because although the detail 
possible from individual case studies iS necessary, it Is also a requirement to 
recognize, and avoid, the tendency to assume that such detail (and the 
conclusions developed) is typical of all agencies. 
As part of the 1982 "Remuneration Study" (updated in 1986). all 
non-departmental agencies were grouped into one of three categories - •A•, 'B', 
or 'C'. These three categories reflect relative levels or degrees of 
responsibility. , As an example, the Board of Manitoba Hydro, classified as an• A' 
agency, has a greater level of responsibility relative to a 'C' agency such as the 
Agricultural Societies Advisory Board. The consequences of action by the Board 
of Manitoba Hydro are of larger significance than those of the Agricultural 
Societies Board because Hydro has a greater impact on the citizens of Manitoba 
than does the Societies Board. Hydro has a greater impact on the citizens of 
Manitoba than does the Societies Board. Class 'B' agencies like the Land Value 
Appraisal Commission, fall between these 'A' and 'C' type agencies in terms of 
their relative levels of responsibility. 
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Within these three categories, agencies were further identified as to their 
primary function. The functions Identified were: judicial, regulation, licensing, 
appeal or advisory. There is some overlap of functions, for example. licensing 
may be viewed as a component of regulation and the sub-category •judicial• may 
more correctly be described as quasi-judicial or adjudicative. The 
sub-categories, as used in the "Remuneration Study•, will be defined in full in 
the following chapters. 
Agencies in the highest responsibility category, or 'A', were are all 
identified as "Regulatory" (as broadly defined in that study), while agencies in 
the third or 'C' category were all placed under the "Advisory9 function.· This 
similarity of function means that the development of an overall profile of those 
categories is relatively straightforward. 
The 'B' category agencies, however, are much more diverse in terms of their 
main function. They have been grouped under one of all five of the functions, 
rather than all under just one function, as is the case for •A• and •c• agencies. In 
order to develop an adequate understanding of 'B' agencies, a more thorough 
profile is provided, and a greater number of case studies are presented. 
The agencies comprising the case studies were chosen to display a number of 
themes and characteristics. Central is their variety of purpose, size and nature 
of responsibility. Others are of interest because they demonstrate a major 
re-direction in policy by a government or reveal a need for such re-direction. 
Still others appear more routine and non-controversial by comparison, yet may 
be of equal importance. 
The "Remuneration Study• categories were defined in the following way: 
-13-
"A - Group 'A' Agencies have legislative authority for their 
establishment and have statutory responsibility for 
administering and managing a major program. The 
activities of many of these agencies are commercial in 
. character, have their own operating budgets and, in all 
likelihood, their own hiring authority. Where they are not 
commercial in nature, agencies in this sub-category would 
be involved in delivery of a program which has a significant 
impact on an area of activity, often through 
precedent-setting decisions made by the agency. These 
agencies often report directly to a Minister rather than 
through the departmental structure.• 12 
The •A• agency chosen from this category is the Manitoba Lotteries 
Foundation. The Foundation was chosen because it has responsibility for the 
delivery of a program which is highly significant as a generator of revenue. It is 
also representative of comprehensive re-direction In policy by the government. 
thereby stimulating considerable controversy, and it ls unique because it involves 
an activity which raises a moral issue in the minds of many people. 
"B - Group 'B' agencies have legislative or ministerial authority 
for their establishment but have much more limited program 
responsibUity when compared with Group 'A' agencies. 
Often regulatory, investigative, appeal or review, 
quasi-judicial or negotiating functions are handled by · 
agencies with this level of responsibility. These agencies 
may have their own staff but would not be involved in any 
activity which would generate income other than a fee or 
other reimbursement for a service. Most of these agencies 
report through a Deputy Minister."1:5 
As a representative of a judicial agency. The Manitoba Labour Board was 
chosen. This Board has also recently undergone major policy re-direction by the 
Government, and, like the Lotteries Foundation, is also controversial. In this 
case, the reason for re-direction stems from a philosophical base rather than a 
pragmatic one. It is not a revenue-generator, but has a powerful impact on the 
revenue-generating capacity of the private sector. 
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The Apprenticeship and Trades Qualifications Board Is a long-standing 'B' 
agency identified as a licensing body, which has remained constant over many 
years. Although apprenticeship and the trades are stlll matters of Importance 
today, this Board has not convened recently. The case study presents an 
opt>ortunity to explore the reasons for this Inactivity. 
The Manitoba Arts Council is a regulatory body (as defined in the 
"Remuneration Study") which originated In the community ln a much more simple 
form. It Is also a long-st.anding agency. but one which ls very act.Ive with a 
high-profile and a public image of independence from government. 
The License Suspension Appeal Board Is charged with an apparently routine 
but on-going task, considered important in Manitoba; interestingly, its 
counterpart is not found In other provinces. It r.eaches a broad spectrum of 
people in a situation not to their liking, thereby providing insights differing from 
those of other agencies. 
"C - Group •c• agencies have ministerial (or, in some cases 
legislative) authority for their establishment. These 
agencies do not usually require an operating budget because 
their primary function is to provide advice and 
recommendations to a Minister directly or through a Deputy 
Minister ... 14 
The agency chosen from this category ls the Council on Aging. Although a 
government is not bound by the out-put of a Board which ls primarily advisory in 
nature, the quality of such advice is of significance to the political arm of 
government, and is not to be underestimated. Action taken on the 
recommendations of this agency could have far-reaching implications for our 
society. 
Each case study involved interviews with at least two individuals, but for 
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some agencies, the number of Interviews reached four. These persons were the 
Chairperson, the Minister's political aide and a departmental official. Many 
others were consulted: the Provincial Auditor's Office (both the pre-audit and 
post-audit people) individuals (civil servants or political aides) who were 
Instrumental in setting-up or re-directing an agency, the Premier's Office and 
members of the community with whom the agency is interacting or serving. 
Written material consulted includes Annual Reports and other documents 
produced by the agencies, the Main Estimates of Expenditure and Revenue, the 
Provincial Auditor's Annual Report and other material preliminary to his final 
report, departmental annual reports, the Statutes of Manitoba, government 
studies and correspondence, the administrative policy manuals of Manitoba and 
other provinces, and finally, various published articles and books in the field. 
The value of the interviews was obviously greater where those Interviewed 
had considerable knowledge of, or experience with, their agency and were willing 
to be candid. It is difficult to assess the amount of candour, because there Is a 
very natural human tendency to "paint the best picture". This was particularly 
true of the Chairpersons interviewed; but others seemed more willing to be 
critical. 
Two final points on the case studies: the picture they provide can only be of 
a certain point in time. Although some history of the agency is provided, a study 
over time may have resulted in different observations. Second. a more thorough 
and detailed examination than is feasible for this study may have produced a 
greater amount of useful data. 
It is certainly recognized that the conclusions which result from the study of 
these particular agencies may not be applicable to other agencies, even to those 
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with a similar role and responsibility. It is hoped. however, that the process of 
examining these agencies will result in a more sound basis for recommendations 
on the treatment of quasi-independent agencies. 
CHAPTER II 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 
The theory relevant to this study of quasi-independent agencies covers two 
topics: (I) the rationale for having chosen the agency form to accomplish a 
particular public goal, and (2) accountability of agencies. In this chapter. 
particular attention will be paid to the manifestation of these theories in 
practice. 
Conceming the rationale for creating quasi-Independent agencies. 
conventional theory provides a number of reasons why agencies are chosen as the 
method of reaching a particular public policy goal. The traditional reasons 
include: the need for administrative flexibility: a requirement that certain 
decisions be reached without political interference or even the appearance of 
interference; and the need for specialized staff not easily found within the civil 
service. To the extent that these reasons are still valid. they may provide some 
clues as to how these agencies may best "fit" into other aspects of government. 
There may even be reasons for creating an agency which are not admitted to 
the public. For example, an advisory body may be appointed to give the 
appearance that the govemment ls taking action on some matter. when in fact it 
only wishes to reassure a particular interest group or the public at large. 
Sometimes, the rationale does not seem to be particularly well thought out. For 
example, we find that the decision to establish some agencies is a reflection of 
the mood best exemplied by C. D. Howe's famous explanation: "That's the way 
we seem to do things around here.*15 If that quote is an accurate reflection 
i 
l 
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of the thought given to the decision to use the agency format, then we can only 
assume that at least some of the time, mere habit is the real •rationale• for 
creating an agency. 
Whatever the reasons for creating agencies, the effect Is to establish bodies 
which differ from departments In how they relate to the bureaucracy, the 
Minister and so on. It is for this reason that the rationale for creating agencies 
has relevance to this paper. Since agencies are treated differently than 
departments, •rationale• Is an important factor which should be examined In 
greater detail. If the reasons for creating an agency can be understood, taking 
into account historical considerations, the popular mood of the time, economic 
realities and other factors, then the development of the most appropriate 
accountability system may be possible. 
The second topic - accountability - has already been Identified as a concern 
in the introductory chapter, but a closer look at accountability is useful in 
relation to the generally-accepted theory on the rationale for creating agencies. 
It is readily evident that accountability requirements and the practical 
implications of having created a quasi-independent agency do not mesh together 
well. It is difficult to develop practical measures which effect a happy 
marriage. It ls important to reiterate that the motivation for reviewing agencies 
is not because the current arrangement is •untidy• but because the current 
arrangement lacks accountability. Standardizing rules and control may or may 
not rectify that: perhaps some other approach would be more successful. 
These perhaps inherently incompatible concepts may result in administrative 
relationships which do not work well and which actually create more serious 
problems than they attempt to solve. The converse may also be true; it may be 
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demonstrated in reviewing individual agencies that their sets of relationships 
serve the non-departmental form very well, and that mandates are met and 
accountability requirements satisfied. 
In theory, accountability Is relatively straightforward. In a democratic 
parliamentary system, elected representatives are answerable to the public, 
through the Legislature. The requirement for answerability means that Ministers 
must explain and justify their actions and, traditionally, resign from the 
Le<;1islature if they cannot do so. This requirement to be accountable is not only 
an indiv\dual responsibility but a collective responslbllity as well, meaning that 
the Cabinet as a whole must retain the support of the majority in the 
Legislature. 
While the theory may be uncomplicated, the structures and systems which 
are required to put accountability into effect are not. Accountability has been 
described as a "set of relationships" 16 through which authority and duties are 
established, a check is made of the exercise of that authority Involving 
disclosure and justification of what takes place, followed with corrective action 
if necessary. This set of relationships comprising an accountability system 
involves all the players: the government-appointed board of an agency: the 
agency's staff; to varying degrees the bureaucracy; the Minister responsible; 
Cabinet; the Legislature and its committees. 
To understand accountability in actual practice, these relationships must be 
examined in some detail. It is not only necessary to look at the agencies 
themselves, but also the role of other units in the bureaucracy - the Provincial 
Auditor, the Comptroller and the Departments of Finance and Crown 
Investments. Close examination of the political players such as Cabinet and the 
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Legislature will be left for another study, although it must be reiterated here 
that it is the Minister and Cabinet who are ultimately responsible. No claim of 
agency independence can ever completely absolve Ministers of that responsibility. 
The relationships in an accountability system are not static or 
self-enforcing - they need •servicing" by enough personnel with enough time to 
make them work well. However, it has often been said that over the years. the 
number and complexity of government programs and policies have increased, 
including those implemented by agencies. It has been noted that it Is becoming 
increasingly unrealistic to expect a Minister to always be fully informed of all 
aspects of the programs and policies under his or her jurisdiction. Therefore, the 
matter would have to be quite serious and indicate poor Judgment on the part of 
the Minister before resignation would likely occur. More often than not, less 
drastic action is taken. A poor decision may be reversible or a new procedure 
established to prevent the error from recurring. So although the theory holds 
that a Minister can be called to account in the Legislature and may be compelled 
to resign, usually the penalty for mistakes involving the administration of a 
program is a loss of political reputation and perhaps a shift to a less important 
portfolio when the next Cabinet shuffle occurs. The real sanction has become a 
damaged reputation, rather than compulsory resignation from the Legislature. 
If Ministers cannot be expected to have reams of detailed information at 
their fingertips when it comes to their departmental responsibilities, it is even 
less realistic to expect them to have a grasp of the details related to arm's 
length agencies. 
Curiously however, that is not always supported by fact. Ministers have 
often been heard to say, in response to an Opposition member's question, that 
ili-
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they were "not concerned with the day to day business of independent agencies" 
even when the question concerns a matter of more substance than is implied by 
"day to day business." Vet, when Hansard is reviewed more thoroughly on any 
subject having to do with quasi-independent agencies, it is surpr:ising just how 
much detail Ministers actually have at their fingertips. One cannot help but 
suspect that the put-off phrase is merely that, a political dodge, intended to 
provide the Opposition with as little information for its own purposes, as is 
possible. The dodge, however, should not be taken at face value, for It is no 
indicator of how much knowledge or factual information the Minister does 
·possess. 17 
A second point about.accountability concerns administrative policies. They 
are an important component of an accountability system, but the preventative 
nature of many such policies lessens their appeal to quasi-independent agencies. 
When the intent is to avoid or prevent the potential for abuse in a particular 
area, the rationale behind a specific rule may be somewhat obscure. As 
quasi-independent agencies tend to be less likely than departments to accept 
without question rules whose purpose is unclear, problems arise with this type of 
policy. In addition, part of the resentment towards administrative controls is 
that they are seen to be based upon fear of abuse (admittedly, they often are). 
rather than confidence that performance will be as expected. There is no 
practical way to avoid this perception, expect to be aware of the problem when 
policies are revised or developed, particularly when policy development occurs as 
a response to a specific case of abuse. Finally, agencies tend to believe, because 
of their arm's length feature, that they should not be bound by the 
administrative rules and regulations which bind departments; whereas 
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departments have no such basis upon which to argue their independence from 
such rules. 
To illustrate the point: a current requirement within the Provincial 
Government is that Delegation of Authority documents be reviewed each year, 
updated and filed with the Provincial Auditor and the Department of Finance. 
The purpose of this rule is to ensure that these important legal documents are 
reviewed and updated at least annually and that some other authority checks 
them for legal correctness. This rule was established because problems were 
actually developing over out-of-date delegations. It had not occurred to some 
officials that reviewing these documents was an important activity, hence the 
rule. Although annual reviews are a fairly entrenched practice now, manY 
managers take the attitude that a formal requirement in the form of an 
administrative policy to do so is a useful reminder, rather than "bureaucratic red 
tape". 
A similar requirement for annual reviews would be of equal relevance to 
quasi-independent agencies, since they also must have legally accurate 
delegation of authority documents. Vet, without an adequate explanation of the 
history behind a particular policy, or at the very least a statement of its purpose, 
agencies tend to assume that the policy is unnecessary and attempt to avoid 
compliance, choosing instead to assert that the administrative rules applicable to 
departments are not appropriate for them. Departments may also not 
understand why a particular administrative policy is important without some 
e)(planatory background, but they cannot attempt to argue exemption on the 
basis of an arm's length relationship. 
The quasi-independent form may be essentially problematic; difficulties 
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with the bureaucracy are to an extent Irresolvable, due to the very nature of 
agencies. Because of this inherent problem, many of the central management 
agencies within the bureaucracy are ill-equipped to deal effectively with 
non-departmental bodies. The result is an uncomfortable and unsatisfactory 
"push-pull" relationship. 
These central management agencies require some review. The mandates, 
role and mission will be described, together with examples of their interaction 
with quasi-independent agencies. 
Central agencies within the bureaucracy such as the Administrative Policy 
Branch, the Financial and Management Systems Branch and the Comptroller all 
within the Department of Finance, the Legal Services Branch in the Department 
of the Attorney-General, and the Provincial Auditor's Office have all received 
many requests for direction and advice from quasi-independent agencies 
regarding their compliance with general standards of the bureaucracy. While 
many of the responses to these queries are appropriate (others are not). they do 
not stem from a well thought-out and articulated "position" on this important 
relationship. 
The f'll'St such central agency to be discussed is the Provincial Auditor's 
Office, which has a key role In the accountability chain. The Provincial Auditor 
has a broad mandate and reports directly to the Legislature on the expenditure 
of public funds and on the adequacy of management and financial information 
systems. The role of the Office is to audit and to evaluate whether there Is 
effective use of appropriate administrative and financial systems. The auditing 
function Is designed to preserve and protect public assets, and involves reporting 
to the Legislature on these more general matters as well as on the fairness of 
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annual financial statements for agencies. 18 
The Auditor's program is comprised of five components into which all 
auditing activities fall. These parts reflect different internal audit situations, 
such as, a newly created or disestablished agency or department, and the time 
and human resources available for auditing. 
The Main Audit, which is an "attest audit", covers departments and those 
quasi-independent agencies which are administered as part of a departmental 
operation. The main audit consumes the greatesf portion of the time of the 
Provincial Auditor's staff. After a preliminary survey, matters requiring action 
wW be brought to the attention of senior officials and the Minister. Concerns 
which are very serious or those which are not resolved, may be reported In the 
Report of the Provincial Auditor. This ls a public document submitted to the 
Legislature each year. 
Most matters of a relatively less serious nature are adequately resolved and 
are not contained in the final report. For example, during the 1984 preliminary 
survey, the Auditor commented that a particular agency did not have the proper 
legal authorization (an Order-in-Council) in place to remunerate its appointed 
members. After investigation by financial personnel, it was clear that the 
omission was an administrative error, easily corrected, and no payments were 
made which were not intended to be made by the Minister and an ad-hoc 
committee of Cabinet called the "Boards and Commissions Committee" which is 
responsible for approving payment levels (and appointments to the various 
agencies). On the surface however, the situation is questionable, possibly 
fraudulent. Certainly If this type of error occurs frequently, the competence of 
the individual responsible would be called into question. 
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A second auditing activity is the Attest Audit of Assigned Crown 
Corporations. These audits are as thorough and comprehensive as those made of 
departmental operations. Because they are very time consuming, the number of 
Corporations receiving attest audits is limited by the staff available to conduct 
the audits; departmental audits are the first priority. Treasury Board has 
approved the list of Crown Corporations StJbject to attest audits by the 
Provincial Auditor and the indications are that this list will grow as the human 
resources assigned to the Provincial Auditor's Office grows. 
Overview Audits comprise the third type of audit. ln these cases, although 
the agencies may be completely funded by the government, (but not necessarily} 
the main audit of the agency's accounts is not performed by the Provincial 
Auditor, but by a private professional accounting firm contracted by the agency 
(with TreaStJcy Board approval) for that purp0se. The Provincial Auditor reviews 
the audited financial statements and management reports with attention to 
administrative management and control, having due regard for economy and 
efficiency. The agency's objectives and organizational structure are reviewed, 
as are its systems for comparing actual a)(penditure to budgeted amounts. 
including explanations for variances. The Provincial Auditor also examines 
internal audit systems, purchasing and staffing procedures and the agency's 
compliance with applicable government guidelines. 19 
Some of the agencies subject to overview audits by the Provincial Auditor 
are: Manitoba Hydro, Manitoba Telephone System, Manitoba Public Insurance 
Corporation, Wori<ers Compensation Board, the Credit Union Stabilization Fund, 
the Conservation Districts of Alonsa, Cooks Creek and Turtle River, among 
others. 20 
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The scope of overview audits appears to be quite broad, thus providing a 
comprehensive picture of the experience of agencies from a financial and 
administrative point of view. The overview audit however, is less effective if 
some of the basic questions concerning the "set of relationships" between the 
agency and other units of the bureaucracy, including the elected representatives, 
are not decided. 
As an example, the Provincial Auditor noted in a preliminary survey that a 
particular Crown Corporation had entered into some financial commitments 
without Treasury Board approval. The Auditor noted that the identical type of 
expenditure by that Corporation had been approved by Treasury Board on other 
occasions. The Chairperson of the Board of Directors replied to the Provincial 
Auditor. stating that the Itemized expenditures had been approved by the 
Corporation's Board of Directors. A copy of the applicable minutes were 
attached to the communique. The Provincial Auditor accepted the Board of 
Directors' recorded decision as sufficient authority, even though Treasury Board 
approval had been obtained previously. The matter was not pursued further, 
although it was never clear that Cabinet intended the Corporation's Board to 
have the authority to make certain spending decisions. The authorizing statute 
which created the Crown Corporation in question offered no guidance on the 
matter. 
Given the importance of a Crown Corporation's decision-making authority, 
the right and duty of Government to confer it, and past practice. it ls 
questionable whether the Provincial Auditor should have accepted the Board's 
authorization and not reported the matter further. The concern here is the 
principle involved, not the specifics of the particular decision. 
- 27 -
This example shows the process to be an effective method of obtaining 
explanations and of correcting errors in procedure, but it also identifies a 
fundamental issue: the authority of a Board of Directors to make certain 
decisions without reference to the Minister responsible, Treasury Board or 
Cabinet. 
The extent of an agency's authority needs to be as explicit as possible, so as 
to be audited properly, ensure accountability and be understandable by those who 
must work within restrictions as well as meet varied responsibilities. Sometimes 
the extent and nature of authority is clear - as evidenced by Ministerial 
direction, Treasury Board minute, Cabinet decision or by the enabling 
legislation. However, the agency's authority is not clear in this example, 
bringing into question the basis upon which the Auditor made a judgment on the 
exercise of that authority. 
Inspection Audits comprise the fourth category and apply to outside bodies 
almost entirely funded by the Provincial Government. These agencies may be 
recipients of public monies for a specific purpose - such as the special $2 mlllion 
grant to the Winnipeg Art Gallery for a new building, and the audit would be 
confined to that grant for the specified purpose. These audits mainly involve a 
review of the recipients' monitoring systems and are generally similar to 
overview audits. 21 Since they involve only a portion of the agency's budget, 
other auditing is done by a private firm hired by the agency. 
Special Audits are conducted as a result of a specific call to do so, usually 
by the Minister of Finance, or the Premier, and are over and above any which 
might take place under any of the four types already discussed. 22 This might 
occur in a cost over-run situation such as with the South Winnipeg Education 
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Centre. Special audits have been conducted of Flyer Industries Ltd. and A. E. 
Mckenzie Co. Ltd. and its subsidiaries. Currently, one is underway with the 
Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation. 
These five types of audits suggest that the scope of the Provincial Auditor is 
broad, but the value of the function is limited by two factors. First is the 
number of staff available to whom auditing assignments may be given, and 
second is the comprehensiveness of each audit. It has also been observed that 
auditing is a retrospective process, sometimes resulting in post-facto approvals 
of individual expenditures, policies and procedures. In the final analysis 
however. the function can serve to galvanize managerial concern for efficiency 
and provide constructive advice for improvements. This effect ls important. 
particularly where managers are given the right to make more and more major 
decisions and to be responsible for those decisions. 
Although the scope of audits conducted by the Provincial Auditor are broad, 
there are other central management functions within the bureaucratic arm of 
govemment which have some applicability to administrative concerns of 
quasi-independent agencies. 
The Administrative Policy Branch in the Department of Finance has 
responsibility for the Identification, development and communication of 
administrative policies and procedures of government-wide applicability. The 
difficulty with this mandate is that "government-wide" is not well defined. 
Although the policies developed and implemented by the Branch have been 
approved by Treasury Board, the extent of their applicability has not been 
specifically addressed. Therefore, there is often disagreement over the 
applicability of policies with respect to non-departmental bodies. 
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The only response to this problem in recent years has been that new 
administrative policies presented to Treasury Board for approval have included a 
recommendation that the policy be applicable, or not applicable, to certain 
specified Crown Corporations and quasi-independent agencies. In some cases, 
applicability may be defined as "those Agencies of the Provincial Government 
which are subject to the provisions of the Civil Service Act", or, a listing of 
agencies may be developed which would include those for whom the policy is 
appropriate. 
While this may be a reasonable approach as an interim measure, it does not 
address the problem of applicability for the large bulk of policies which have 
been put in place prior to the early l 980's. 
Finally, there is still a problem with some new policies because it Is not 
clear, even after study, that they are appropriate for some agencies but not 
others. In other words, there is not a systematic way of evaluating and 
classifying policies (assuming that is the appropriate way to determine 
applicability), nor has there ever been a systematic evaluation and classification 
of agencies, which may uncover data of relevance to the applicability question. 
The lack of research concerning the applicability of administrative policy, 
obviously does not eliminate the need for information. Questions on applicability 
are still put, but rather than inconsistent and crisis-oriented responses, they 
deserve a response which ·is based on adequate and relevant data. 
Other areas have a central management responsibility which can also have 
an impact on quasi-independent bodies. The Comptroller's Division of Manitoba 
Finance is an example, specifically. its Financial and Management Systems 
Branch. This Branch develops the detailed accounting policies and procedures 
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which must be followed by all departments and any agency which functions 
within a departmental structure. The applicability of such policies and 
procedures to all non-departmental bodies is unclear. 
Another Branch within the Comptroller's Division relevant to the operations 
of many agencies Is the Treasury Board Support Branch. Analyses of all 
expenditure submissions to Treasury Board are prepared by staff of this Branch 
to assist the decision-making of the Cabinet members who serve on Treasury 
Board. The Branch is also responsible for the review of the detailed annual 
departmental estimates of expenditures for the benefit of Treasury Board and 
ultimately, Cabinet. Although some quasi-independent agencies report to 
Treasury Board, while others do not, there has never been a formal list prepared 
setting forth those agencies which must refer to Treasury Board. 
The Boards and Commissions Committee of Cabinet is responsible for 
review of all appointments to various agencies, prior to the preparation of an 
Order-in-Council (where an Order is required). Other administrative matters 
related to agencies are also considered by this Committee, such as changes to 
the level of remuneration made to members and various other administrative 
matters. 
In general, the difficulties all these central management agencies have with 
respect to non-departmental bodies arises from the same underlying problem. 
The lack of attention on how quasi-independent agencies will relate to the 
bureaucracy has resulted in some confusion, conflict and a weak accountability 
system. 
CHAPTER III 
'A' AGENCIES 
Overview 
In this Chapter a case study of one of the group 'A' agencies will be 
presented. In addition, other information on these agencies will be included to 
provide a general overview or profile of 'A' agencies. 
The overview is intended to provide enough information about agencies in 
the group so as to assist in the development of a general understanding of 'A' 
agencies as a type. While an overview may help provide a broad picture, the 
detail possible from a more thorough examination of one agency offers a greater 
likelihood that the conclusions drawn will be well-founded. 
Group •A• agencies have been sub-divided into two categories. The first 
category is comprised of the twenty-one Crown Corporations which are under 
the jurisdiction of the Department of Crown Investments. A complete listing of 
these agencies is found in Appendix 2.. 
At the time the Department of Crown Investments was established, there 
was not a consensus from Cabinet as to which Crown Corporations should come 
under the Department's purview.23 The Provincial Auditor was consulted, and 
the resulting list included only those with a major revenue-generating potential. 
A notable omission is the lotteries Foundation: however, at the time of Crown 
Investments' establishment. the Government had not taken control of the 
lotteries Industry. The Foundation was then known as the Manitoba lotteries 
and Gaming Control Commission and had a much less comprehensive mandate 
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than at present. Although now that its mandate has been enhanced to permit a 
major revenue generating capacity. the Foundation has not been placed within 
the Department of Crown Investments' Jurisdiction. 
The main activity of many of •A• corporations is commercial in nature. The 
utilities corporations are found under this category, as are other corporations 
and agencies with a major economic impact on the province, such as the Motor 
Transport Board and the Natural Products Marl<etlng Council. Although the 
policy objectives of these corporations are varied, they share the same relative 
high level of responsibility that warrants their inclusion in the 'A' category. 
At the time this study was in progress. the Department of Crown 
Investments had begun a review of all administrative policies as they relate to 
Crown Corporations. The Department had entered into a year-long contract 
with an outside consultant to do the study. The terms of reference were fairly 
broad, but the purpose of the contract was to assist the department in the 
development of comprehensive administrative and policy guidelines targeted to 
certain issues and Crown Corporations. The department wanted consistency of 
application among the corporations with due consideration for govemment policy 
and the differing commercial environment in which each corporation operates. 
The result of this endeavour was expected to be a manual of administrative 
policy tentatively titled the Corporate Manual of Administration. 
The consultant contracted to do the work convened a committee of 
corporate officials to review the General Manual of Administration and to assess 
Its applicability in the corporate situation prior to deriving from it, a Corporate 
Manual of Administration. Curiously however, the consultant's contract was 
terminated before development of the manual. Although departmental officials 
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refuse to confirm this, it has been suggested that the contract was terminated 
largely because the consultant resisted undue direction from departmental 
officials regarding the content of his final report. Apparently, senior staff in the 
department felt that a manual could be developed very easily, but officials of 
the Crown Corporations contacted by the consultant wanted greater inpUt into 
the process than the department had in mind. 24 
As the Crown Investments review overlapped the purposes of this study, 
approaches to the Corporations for interviews and written material may have 
been viewed as an unwanted duplication, especially by busy Chairpersons and 
Chief Executive Officers; a detailed examination of those Corporations has been 
excluded from this study. It should also be noted that the decision to exclude 
Crown Corporations (under the jurisdiction of Crown Investments) should not be 
interpreted to mean that accountability is not an issue with these Corporations. 
It certainly is. However, the matter Is highly sensitive at this time and it is not 
likely that the necessary co-operation would have been forthcoming. 
Some general comment on these agencies, however, is in.order. As a 
category, this sub-group of agencies is not as homogeneous as might first 
appear. For example. it is the intent of the Department of Crown Investments 
to be the vehicle through which strategies reflecting Government policies are 
communicated to Corporations.. However, Treasury Board in some cases may 
partially fill this role. Some of these Corporations. for example, The Liquor 
Control CommiHlon, Manitoba Agricultural Credit Corporation, Manitoba Crop 
Insurance Corporation and to some extent The Manitoba Public Insurance 
Corporation refer to Treasury Board for direction on budgetary matters, staffing 
complements, and approval in specified policy areas. Other Corporations, such 
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as Manitoba Forestry Resources Ltd. and A. E. McKenzie Ltd. do not request 
such approvals from Treasury Board. 
As well as the inconsistency regarding the role of Treasury Board for some 
of these Corporations, those of, for example, an agricultural interest, have a 
further complication. Traditionally, these Corporations have always reported to 
the Minister of Agriculture, but with their inclusion under the jurisdiction of the 
Department of Crown Investments, they now have two Ministers to whom they 
must report. That is, as well as the Minister designated by the 
Lieutenant-Governor in Council as responsible for the agency, the Minister of 
Crown Investments has a responsibility too. This atTangement has the potential 
for creating confusion unless the responsibility areas are very well-defined. 
'The second sub-section of the 'A' category agency (ie: those not within the 
resi)onslbility area of the Department of Crown Investments) are those of 
primary interest in this study. These agencies are responsible for the delivery of 
a program which has a substantial impact on a specific Industry or the entire 
Manitoba public. Generally, less attention has been paid to these agencies: their 
relationship to Government is even less well-defined than those Crown agencies 
which fall under the Department of Crown Investments. 
As a group, these agencies engage In a wide range of activities. Some may 
have primarily a financial responsibility, such as the Public Schools Finance 
Board. Others have a regulatory function, such as the Horse Racing Commission 
or the Clean Environment Commission. On the other end of the scale is an 
agency with adjudicative responsibility which also administers a major program, 
such as the Workers Compensation Board. Finally, some are charged with the 
responsibility for management of a major program involving an institution such 
as the Alcoholism Foundation of Manitoba, the Health Sciences Centre, or the 
Cancer Treatment and Research Foundation. 
The membenhip of this group may be characterized as the most consistently 
professionally qualified of any of the three main categories of agencies. The 
majority of members have professional credentials often cfU"ectly related to the 
agency to which they have been appointed. Members of the medical profession 
are appointed to health related agencies, for example the Mental Health · 
Research Foundation and the Sanatorium Board. 
Remuneration may be nil; for example, all members of the board of 
directors of the Health Sciences Centre and civil servants on any board are not 
remunerated for that participation. Members of the board for the .Alcoholism 
Foundation receive a yearly honorarium of $1,200.00, while members of the 
Public Schools Finance Board receive $7,440.00 per year for their contribution. 
On the opposite end of the spectrum to the Health Sciences Centre board is the 
Labour Board, whose members receive $200.00 per day plus $30.00 per hour for 
time spent researching and writing decisions. 
Most of the members are appointed to provide a part-time function. with 
the exception of the. Workers Compensation Board. In this case, all perform a 
full-time responsibility and are compensated more generously (or merely 
adequately, depending on one's point of view) than the "honorarium" concept, 
which is the most commonly used principle upon which remuneration is based. 
The Manitoba Housing and Renewal Corporation, while a semi-autonomous 
agency insofar as It has legal status as a Corporation, is structured in this 
manner in order to facilitate the acquisition and disposition of real estate. In all 
other .aspects of its operation, however. the Corporation functions similarly to 
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any department of the Government, and, in fact, Is generally less autonomous 
than other agencies within the •A• category. 
This category contains other anomalies as well. The Health Services 
Commission also functions in a manner similar to any department. Its Estimates 
are presented to Treasury Board each year, together wlth those of other units of 
the Department of Health. All the Treasury Board directives regarding such 
matters as staffing, out-of-province travel and over-expenditures apply to the 
Commission, just as they would to any department. In contrast, the Alcoholism 
Foundation of Manitoba receives Transfer Payments,25 from the Provincial 
Government on a quarterly basis through the Consolidated Revenue Fund but It 
does not fall under Treasury Board direction. Reporting on the use of these 
quarterly transfers is dissimilar to the kind of reporting the Commission does 
with Its department-like structure. 
Functions performed by the Alcoholism Foundation of Manitoba and the 
Sanatorium Board of Manitoba are not unlike that of the Manitoba Development 
Centre (formerly the Portage la Prairie School for Retardates) in terms of their 
uniqueness and appropriateness for public sector financing, yet the first two 
function as quasi-independent agencies, while the Development Centre does not. 
All three have a similar requirement for professional expertise supposedly not 
normally found in government, which is one of the usual reasons for creating a 
quasi-independent agency. This "rationale" could not in all likelihood be upheld 
today, since government now hires all manner of professional expertise. The 
point is however, that whatever the rationale is for deciding that the Alcoholism 
Foundation and the Sanatorium Board are more appropriate as quasi-independent 
agencies, it must be as applicable to the Development Centre. 
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The Manitoba Energy Authority also has a feature which gives the Authority 
a unique aspect within the 'A' category. In February of 1984, Treasury Board 
directed that the Authority would be exempt from all provisions of the General 
Manual of Administration. Although periodic review of this decision is required, 
the Intent is to allow greater independence from the administrative arm of 
Government than was previously experienced. The exemption was requested 
during a transition period in which the Authority was to "gear-up" for an 
expanded mandate which would bring it into line with other major Crown 
Corporations in terms of scope and impact. A need for flexiblllty similar to that 
of other Corporations was cited as the rationale for the exemption. 
This portion of the chapter Is intended to provide an overview of agencies in 
the 'A' category - a general picture of a specific "type" of quasi-independent 
body. The final portion of this chapter is a case study of the Manitoba Lotteries 
Foundation. The purpose of the case study is to present a more detailed view of 
an agency In the 'A' category. The overview and the greater detail of the case 
study together provide a more well-rounded examination. 
- 30 -
Manitoba Lotteries Foundation 
The Manitoba Lotteries Foundation was established in March, l'i103 as a 
result of extensive re-direction of policy by the Manitoba Government. This new 
direction meant the repeal of the Lotteries and Gaming Control Act and the 
disestablishment of the Manitoba Lotteries and Gaming Control Commission and 
the Manitoba Lotteries and Gaming Licensing Board. In turn, the Manitoba 
Lotteries Foundation Act was proclaimed. establishing the Foundation and 
setting out new policies and goals concerning the conduct and management of 
lotteries in Manitoba. 
The primary function of the Foundation's predecessor was the licensing of 
lottery schemes~ That Commissions' agreement with .the former Western -
Manitoba Distributor Inc. provided for the net revenues from lottery sales of the 
Commission .and of Western - Manitoba Distributor Inc. to be:.apportioned 4'il'lf. 
and Sl 'lf. respectively, except for new revenues from Lotto 6/4'il. 26 
In l'J83, however, new policy was in place which provided for the Foundation 
itself to undertake the sale, marketing and distribution.of lottery products 
through authorized retailers. In addition, as the Crown agency responsible for 
the conduct and management of all lottery schemes, the Foundation 
re-structured the lotteries industry to help ensure fair games, the maximization 
of profits and to provide an equitable distribution of revenues to charitable 
groups throughout the province. 
The Foundation has now assumed full responsibility for the distribution of 
lottery tickets and the operation of casinos. Revision of the terms and 
conditions for the licensing and operation of bingo events and the sale of 
- 39 -
breakopen tickets mis taken place, and where the Foundation issues licenses, it 
also undertakes a supervisory and compliance control role. Where the licensed, 
or other approved organization does not operate the lottery Itself. the 
Foundation can do so on Its behalf. 27 
Another major new policy for the Foundation was the establishment of eight 
umbrella organizations for the distribution of lotteries revenues. These eight 
groups encompass sports, the arts, multiculturalism, community services, ' 
heritage, museums and festivals, community education, and medical research. It 
ls anticipated that eventually the umbrella organizations will have full 
responsibility for the fair and equitable distribution of revenues from lotteries 
operated by ·the Foundation. 28 
, The Government's new direction required considerable re-structuring of the 
Feundation. The rather complicated arrangement of the Foundation's 
predecessor involved two separate organizational units. The old Commission was 
a quasi-independant body charged with responsibility for the marketing of 
lotteries. 
The licensing body however, was part of the Department of the 
Attorney-General and followed all the administrative rules and procedures 
applicable to any government branch or division. Its staff, who were civil 
servants, were responsible for accounting and personnel matters. All revenues 
collected through the levying of fees for the issuance of licenses were deposited 
directly into the Consolidated Revenue Fund. 29 
The new Foundation consolidated these two functions under one 
organization. All staff are civil servants and fall within the scope of the Civil 
Service Act and the Civil Service Superannuation Act. This decision was made in 
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order to provide protection of and control over staff who would very much be in 
the public eye. The decision to increase control and direction was a deliberate 
move.made with just cause. A more cost-conscious judgment was thought to be 
necessary on director's travel and other out-of-pocket expenditures. Apparently 
some expenses may not have been judged •reasonable and necessa~ by a critical 
public. :50 
This quite cautious approach to operating expenditures continues today. The 
General Manual of Administration is followed, even thoughlts applicability to an 
agency such as the Foundation is not clear. The Provincial Auditor has indicated 
to Foundation management that expenditures would be considered acceptable if 
they have the Board's or the Minister's approval, which is, not interpreted as a 
requirement to follow the General Manual of Administration, yet the Foundation 
has chosen to do so. 
The Foundation's enabling legislation provides the Board with the legal 
authority to make decisions concerning administrative expenditures. The statute 
shows that, in theory, the Government intended an •arm's length• relationship. 
Yet, in practice. the Government accepts its ultimate responsibility for the 
Foundation by providing direction at meetings of the Board of Directors, 
reviewing financial reports and supporting use of the General Manual of 
Administration as a tool for guidance and direction on administrative policy and 
procedures. 
A brief examination of the budget approval process for the Foundation may 
help clarify the relationship between the Minister and the Board of Directors. 
The annual budget Is prepared by Foundation staff. Formal approval of the 
budget by the Minister is not obtained, nor is such authorization required. 
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Although. as she is consulted and advised of the content of the budget, there is 
opportunity for the Minister to intervene and play a stronger role should she so 
desire. Financial reports are made monthly to the Board; again, these reports. as 
well as minutes of every meeting, are copied to the Minister. According to the 
General Manager, the current Minister attends the monthly Board meetings 
every two or three months, resulting in a continuous and well-informed 
interaction. 
The 19B:S changes required an increase of staff at a time when every vacant 
or new position required Treasury Board approval prior to Initiation of the hiring 
process. These requests were thoroughly considered by Treasury Board; the 
number which were declined can be taken as an indication that the process was 
not a riJbber stamp approval. 
The General Manager reports that policy changes are made by the Board, 
under its own authority, but with the "co-operation and consent" of the 
Minister. One cannot avoid speculating that these must not be major matters. 
given the strong direction and control by Government which resulted in the 
creation of the Foundation and its new policies and goals. Although the phrase 
suggests a strong role for the Board. the frequency of the Minister's attendance 
at the monthly Board meetings indicates the probable strong policy direction the 
Foundation continues to receive from this Government. 
The Foundation is audited annually by the Provincial Auditor as to its 
financial operations. Statements presenting the financial position are contained 
in each year's annual report which Is tabled by the Minister in the Legislature. 
The Annual Report, which is a post-factg document, has received 
considerable attention in the Legislature, as does the proposed use of lotteries 
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revenue during the debate following presentation of the annual Estimates at the 
beginning of the fiscal year. 31 In response to Opposition queries, the Minister 
showed detailed knowledge of the Foundational operations, suggesting a close 
relationship, 
The board of the Foundation is at present comprised of 10 members: a 
minimum of 9 is required by the enabling legislation. It is clear from the 
background of these 10 members that an attempt has been made to appoint a 
representative board - representative in a number of ways. The board involves 
rural as well as urban members, Francophones, women, a union representative 
and others with a background in the lotteries industry which provides valuable 
expertise. One member has experience In the sports industry, one of the areas 
sUPported by lotteries revenue. At least six of these individuals are known to be 
supporters of the New Democratic Party, including the most crucial member -
the Chairperson. 
The Foundation's decisions are the result of a formal voting process 
involving all members, although much of the preliminary work is done by 
sub-committees of the Board working In a number of areas. Foundation staff 
also attend board meetings to provide information and support. This process is 
effective and apparently has produced few problems. The current Chairperson 
exercises a management style which emphasizes participation by all members of 
the Board of Directors. 
The commitment to the Board involves attendance at monthly, day-long 
meetings, or more frequent meetings if required. Pre-meeting material may 
require an extra two to three hour'!; reading prior to each meeting. The licensing 
function is accomplished by a weekly meeting; however: since two Is a quorum, 
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this task does not tend to result in an overload for any one member. 
.. Considering the substantial revenues generated through lotteries, it is not 
surprising that the Government wished to exert strong direction. especially since 
it would be approached directly by many groups for funding if lotteries revenue 
could not be made available to these groups. Justification for intervention was 
based on the Government's perception that there was a lopsided distribution of 
lottery profits. The Government was without the means, within the structure in 
place at the time, to strengthen its control and re-distribute the profits. 
The re-organization has resulted in changes not to everyone's liking. The 
private enterpreneurs who aperated bingo halls and casinos and some of the 
charitable or non-profit groups who hired promoters to capture as much lottery 
monies as possible have not realized as great a share of the profits as 
previously. The public in general is in receipt of greater funds, as more lotteries 
revenue is available for distribution to a wider spectrum of activities. Many 
groups who are now recipients of the funds generated, were not previously. 
The lotti;iries industry continues to be controversial. It is likely to continue 
to be so at least until this transitional period has passed. The Government has 
made strong re-direction in this area, a fact which ls still in the public's 
memory; the Minister responsible, rather than the Foundation, is still approached 
directly by members of. the public and decisions still seem, to some extent, to be 
made by the Government, rather than by the Foundation. Once the umbrella 
groups are fully functional, and if the present direction ls continued, the 
Foundation will become more autonomous, at least as perceived by the public. 
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Analysis 
The most useful observation to make about the Manitoba Lotteries 
Foundation is that it is an agency currently in a transition period following 
massive change to its legislated mandate. This phase of the Foundation's 
existence is unique because. although it operates differently now than before the 
re-structuring, it is likely to shift again slightly once the new focus is well 
established and the agency ls functioning smoothly. 
This transition phase is characterized by a relatively close relationship 
between the Foundation and the Government, much closer than for agencies with 
i::omparable levels of responsibility. This close SUpervision is appropriate when 
the. magnitude of the change and the mixed public reaction to the change are 
considered. The move generated considerable controversy for the Government, 
and this added to the reasons why the new Foundation should be closely watched. 
It is also likely, however, that the Foundation will eventually experience 
greater independence, similar to that of comparable agencies, although the 
moral issue involved with gambling does give the Foundation a uniqueness. In 
spite of the moral issue however, this outcome can tie predicted on several 
grounds. First, there.is a case to be made for impartiality. The Government 
must be seen (eventually) as not part of the process of deciding which groUP 
receives what amount in lottery funds. The Government is certainly responsible 
for structuring the distribution scheme of lottery funds, but not for the detailed 
decisions on who gets what. The distribution scheme might stipulate, for 
examj>le, that 25% of lottery revenue be used by the arts, 20% by sports 
organizations, and so on. But It ls an umbrella group of the recipient 
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01"9anizations who must make the final decision on amount and beneficiary, and 
most importantly, accept the consequences of that decision. 
Second, the Government is sensitive to the moral issue raised bY seeming to 
promote gambling, which is viewed as morally reprehensible by many voters. A 
truly independent body has some potential for deflecting that problem for any 
government. 
Third, if lottery funds rather than tax money are accepted as the 
appropriate source of assistance for various groups, then the Government may be 
able to divert successfully increasing requests for greater assistance, (assuming 
an inability to respond with more money). lf the revenue generated through 
lotteries was the only financial pie available for these organizations. they would 
perhaps more readily accept its limitations. The hope is that this may 
.circumvent the perception that the government has unlimited financial 
resources, since revenue generated through lotteries can more easily be seen as 
having a llmlt. 
Finally, one of the publicly-stated reasons the Government gave for taking 
control of the lotteries industry was that the sector needed "cleaning up". There 
was not only some unfairness in the old set-up~ butthere were fraudulent and 
unethical practices. While this·may be a fairly noble rationale, once the 
lotteries image is up-graded, this reason for intruding into the sector will be 
forgotten by the general public. . · 
Unlike the popular perception concerning most Ministers and the agencies 
for which they are responsible, the Minister responsible for the Lotteries 
Foundation is very knowledgeable in its day to day operations. This is evidenced 
by responses to questions in the House, as recorded by Hansard. Detailed 
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Information was provided when the question was put, without having to take the 
question as notice. Since the Minister attends almost half of the monthly 
meetings of the Foundation, this knowledge of its operations Is not surprising. In 
addition, the Minister receives monthly financial reports and minutes of the 
monthly board meetings. This is not the case with many other agencies, 
including those with either similar or differing levels of responsibility. 32 
Curiously. the Chairperson of the Foundation describes their practice of 
providing minutes and financial reports to the Minister as a "courtesy". When 
one reviews the enabling legislation, however, it is clear that financial and other 
reporting Is to be made to the Minister as requested {by the Minister); A 
political aide who assisted in the re-directing of the Foundation confirmed that 
the reporting that is done was formally requested by the Minister. This 
mandatory requirement for reporting can then hardly be described as a courtesy. 
The Chairperson's position reflects a desire to stress the independence of the 
Foundation. a position which over time could lead to conflict with the 
government. It is important that this attitude be understood by those who 
Interact with the agency. 
The General Manager recognizes the sensitivity of this situation and is 
skillful in balancing the desire for independence by the Foundation with the need 
for accountability. He views following the rules and procedures of the General 
Manual of Administration as one way in which the Foundation can be 
accountable. Foundation staff have been instructed to follow the Manual, but 
this fact is certainly not emphasized to the appointed body who would argue that 
it is not appropriate. In fact, the Chairperson has stated that even if a copy of 
the Manual Is on hand, it is only used as a reference. Yet, staff of the 
Administrative Policy Branch report that requests for interpretations on the 
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Manual come as frequently from the Foundation as from any other department. 
Administratively, there seems to be no reason why an agency such as the 
Lotteries Foundation cannot function much like any department of govemment. 
Their requirement for independence stems from the need for impartiality - their 
decisions concerning distribution of lotteries revenue to groups must be free 
from political influence. There ls no evidence that the Foundation's requirement 
for independence needs to extend to administrative matters. where functioning 
within the rules and procedures applicable to departments can be seen as a 
partial fulfillment of the requirements of an accountability system. It is 
doubtful whether ministerial approval of budgets and staffing levels could be an 
effective basis for the application of political pressure, since decisions on the 
distribution of lottery funds will be made by an umbrella group of the recipient 
organizations. 
CHAPTER IV 
'B' AGENCIES 
:' 
Overview 
Group •a• agencies pose the greatest difficulty in presenting a profile, as 
they are by far the most diverse group of the three. This diversity involves many 
factors - function, staffing level. budget, revenue generated, interaction with 
the public, extent of independence, remuneration made to appointed members 
and attention or controversy generated by the agency. Function is a crucial 
criterion not only because it describes the main activity of the agency but also 
because it has been used to subdivide the three levels of responsibility - 'A'. •a• 
and 'C'. For this reason, the criterion of "function" deserves special attention. 
Unlike 'A' agencies which are primarily regulatory, and 'C' agencies which 
are advisory, these agencies may fall under any one of the five main functions. 
One such fu.nction - judicial, involves agencies which have a responsibility for 
adjudicating, judging or arbitrating with regard to an individual or group matter. 
Many of these agencies carry out their activities in a court-like fashion. 
Hearings may be held, witnesses subpoenaed, written judgments given, and so 
on. Some, such as the Human Rights Commission, have the power to levy fines 
for infringements of the Act, or prescribe awards, financial or otherwise, to 
injured parties. Others.such as the Minister's Board on Mental Health can order 
an individual confined to a mental health institution, or order his or her release. 
The Mining Board exercises its authority over mines through. the issuance of 
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rulings and orders affecting their operation. These judgments carry the welght 
of court orders. As with the decisions of other judicial bodies, rulings can be 
appealed to a higher court in the Judicial system. 
The second main function which comprises the 'B' category is "regulatory" •. 
As stated In an earlier chapter, the regulating function has been broadly 
defined. It covers much more than the control or direction over a profession or 
industry normally associated with bodies identified as "regulatory", whether 
independent, departmental or self-regulating bodies. Regulation is usually 
thought to be confined to the modification of economic behaviour in the private 
sector~ These constraints are always backed by the authority of a government 
and are often, alth~ugh not consistently, delivered by a quasi-independent 
agency. :S :S 
Regulatory agenci~ in this. study al~ Include those bodies whose main 
responsibility is to govern or direct an activity, profession or industry; but these 
.areas may .not be economic in essence. For instance, the Agricultural Lands 
Protection Board, the Manitoba Arts Council, the Board of Le Centre Culture! 
Fral')Co-Manitobain, the Teachers' Certification Board and the Veterinary 
Medical. Board are.all examples of agencies which have significant impact in 
their respective areas but which may not be identified as "economic" in the usual 
sense. Vet, they are recognized as having a regulatory function under the 'B' 
category of agenc:;y for puwoses of the "Remuneration Study" and that 
classification is used here. 
.1 
Other regulatory agencies are more clearly regulatory in the usual sense • 
. Producer Marketing Boards are an example. Approximately twenty of these 
bodjes exist to effect thl:l orderly marketing of a large variety of Manitoba 
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"natural" products, including crops such as cauliflower, broccoli, potatoes, corn, 
squash arid sugar beets: The Boards also regulate the marketing of such products 
as chickens, turkeys, eggs, honey, milk and hogs. All Producer Marketing Boards 
report to the Manitoba Natural Products Marketing Council, a 
government-appointed and remunerated quasi-independent agency. 
'B' agencies with an appeal function, as the word indicates, act as an agency 
to which requests can be made to alter the decision of a body lower in the 
hierarchy. A quasi-independent agency created for this purpose can offer 
impartiality in the appeal process, and an important buffer for the government is 
generated, should the decision on appeal be unpopular. Manitoba agencies of this 
type include:· the Crop Insuranee Act Appeal Tribunal, the Police Commission, 
the License Suspension Appeal Board, the Land Value Appraisal Commission, the 
Medical Review Committee, the Rates Appeal Board {for the Manitoba Public 
Insurance Corporation), Residential Rent Arbitrators, the Social Services 
Advisory Committee, the Student Aid Appeal Board and the Teachers' 
Certification Appeal Committee. The sub-category is not intended to capture 
all those with some appeal responsibility, only thOse whose function is primarily 
one of appeal.· Some agencies do have a significant appeal responsibility as part 
of their overall mandate. The Horse Racing Commission and the Pension 
Commission are two examples. 
· One of the smallest groups is the sub-category whose main responsibility is 
to license. These agencies grant approval to an individual or body to engage in a 
business, occupation or activity which would be unlawful without the explicit 
permission of the agency. The granting of a license is a discretionary power 
which requires the agency to determine whether issuance of the license is in the 
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public interest. Often, the agency has the power to revoke a license previously 
given, or attach conditions to it not previously in force. The licensing function is 
not as simple a responsibility as one might suspect. For example, the 
Apprenticeship and Trades Qualifications Board is classified as a licensing body 
because of its role in setting the criteria for the designation of individuals as . 
apprentices or journeymen in the trades over which such regulation is provided, 
a task not usually thought of as licensing. The Horse Racing Commission has the 
authority to issue licenses as required by the regulations to its Act, yet the 
primary function of the Commission is identified as regulatory. O_ther examples 
of licensing bodies are the Liquor Licensing Board, the Day Care Staff 
Qualifications Review Committee, the Manitoba Dairy Board and the Embalmers 
and Funeral Directors Board of Administration. 
The fifth and final classification under the "function" category covers those 
agencies whose major activity is advisory. This sub-category immediately is 
reminiscent of the 'C' category, but it differs in one important respect. These 
advisory agencies have a mandate which covers a wide spectrum of topics. For 
example, the Advisory Council on the Status of Women is expected to provide its 
advice on ·a wide variety of topics ranging from child care to pensions to 
executive advancement to labour issues. This is quite distinct in scope to the 
Horticultural Societies Advisory Committee which must confine its 
recommendations to those which are specifically relevant to horticultural 
issues. Likewise, the mandate of the Manitoba Intercultural Council is ·. 
essentially advisory, but the scope of the advice to be provided is quite broad. 
The Council covers all issues of relevance to its clientele, which is far-ranging. 
Bodies with narrower advisory roles are the Propane Gas Advisory Board or the 
- 52 -
Languages of Instruction Advisory Committee. Examples of bodies classified 
under this section vary from the Agricultural Crown Lands Advisory Council to 
the Co-operative Promotion Board, the Drug Standards and Theraupetic 
Formulary Advisory Committee, the Law Reform Commission and the 
Permanent Committee on Geographical Names. These agencies represent a much 
broader scope than the advisory bodies of the 'C' category. It should be stressed, 
however, that the value placed on these agencies by the government is not 
related to their rating as a 'B' or 'C' agency. 
There are some other observations to be made about 'B' category agencies. 
Although they show considerable variation in function, a surprising number of 
these functioos require the agency to be response-oriented. This means that the 
agency has less control over its workload; ttie time commitment of members can 
be quite variable. It cannot always be accurately projected, for example, how 
many applications will be received in a year. 
More '8' agencies that 'A' or 'C' seem to have been established to provide 
Impartiality in a decision-making area. Sometimes it is believed inappropriate 
for the government to be making certain kinds of decisions, for example, the 
granting of a liquor license or the reinstatement of an individual's driver's 
license which has been suspended because of traffic or liquor violations. 
The advantage of an impartial decision-making body is not limited to the 
image of fairness which an independent body connotes: should the decision be 
unpopular with the applicant or controversial In some way, the government may 
be effectively buffered from public criticism. Given the desire of any 
government to avoid public criticism, the distance maintained between them and 
such bodies can be seen as useful, although it is difficult to ascertain just how 
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effective this *distancing• can be. 
The annual budgets of 'B' agencies vary widely, as does the remuneration 
made to members. Some agencies have a nil operating budget and a membership 
which is reimbursed for out-of-pocket expenses only. Other members have been 
appointed to agencies with operating budgets of $112 million and are 
remunerated generously for their participation. This variation is explained 
partly by differences in mandate, but also by a history of decisions on 
remuneration made in an ad-hoc fashion rather than based on systematic and 
'CO!lSistent analysis • 
. Four.agencies have tieen chosen as case studies for the 'B' category. These 
, agencies are examples of four out of .five functions - judicial, regulatory, 
licensing and appeal. A study of the remaining function - advisory has not been 
included because they are somewhat similar to •c• agencies. As stated earlier, 
the main difference between 'B' advisory, and •c• agencies is the scope of their 
advice-giving mandate, and although this does affect Important areas such as 
budget and administrative relationships, relevant points on these teplcs can be 
. made .without providing detailed case studies. 
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Manitoba Labour Board 
The primary function of the Manitoba Labour Board ls to carry out various 
responsibilities of the Labour Relations Act. As stated in that Act, the purpose 
of the Board is to "further harmonious relations between employers and 
employees by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining 
between representatives of employees and employers." The Act provides more 
detail, but the activities undertaken by the Board to accomplish this function, 
may be summarized to include: inquiry into alleged unfair labour practices 
(which may require a hearing) and endeavouring to effect a settlement; 
certification (or decertification) of a union as the bargaining agent, as it relates 
to the regulations on ndes.of·procedure. 34 
The Act, including the. responsibilities of the Board, underwent major 
revision in 1985 to reflect the Intent of the Government to promote labour 
relations through the collective bargaining process. The re-structured Board 
now has a full-time chairperson and four part-time vice-chairpersons, all 
Lieutenant-Governor in. Council appointments. Professional and administrative 
staf'f to the Board are all Civil Service employees. · . 
The Board not only.hears applications under. the new Labour Relations Act 
but also under the Employment Standards Act, the Payment of Wages Act, the 
Vacations With Pav Act a.nd the Workplace Safety and Health Act. It is, 
however, the Labour Relations Act·under which the activities of the Board are 
authorized • 
. The revised Statute and revamped Board occurred in 1985 following many 
months of review of Manitoba's labour law and those of other provinces. The 
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Government had announced its intent to overhaul labour relations in the previous 
provincial election and the review was part of the fulfillment of that promise. 
During the labour law review and prior to implementation of a new Board, 
consideration had been given to according greater control over administrative 
support matters to the chairperson. This was the recommendation made to the 
Government and was strongly favoured by the Board's chairperson who played an 
active role in the development of the restructured Board. When the proposal was 
submitted to Cabinet, it received general support - in principle - but the cost of 
these recommendations became a major consideration. The decision finally 
made was that the senior official of the Board would report through the 
departmental structure on administrative matters. In the few months that have 
passed since that decision, no major difficulties have arisen from this 
arrangement. The only complaint which comes from those appointed to the 
Board and those involved in the labour law review, is that the funding is 
inadequate and that it makes little sense fcir the Government to approve a major 
policy thrust without approving an adequate administrative budget. 35 
·Twenty-four individuals function as members, thereby becoming the largest 
Boari!, in terms of number of appointees, reviewed as one of the case studies in 
this paper. These twenty-one invididuals all bring a relevant labour/management 
background fo the Board. Of the current.membership, twelve represent 
employees, while 'nine represent employers: seventeen of these members are 
men, four are women." The two vice-chairpersons and the chairperson are male. 
The Board has members appointed from three groups: representatives from 
labour, business and also the legal profession. Although the current chairperson 
is not a lawyer, all four vice-chairpersons are practising lawyers whose specialty 
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is labour law. Apparently. it is unusual for a chairperson of a provincial labour 
board ,not to be from the legal profession, particularly where the enabling 
legislation gives broad quasi-judicial responsibilities to the Board. 
The new Labour Relations Act and the responsibilities of the Board 
represent a strong philosophical position of the Government, including a desire to 
see certain labour policy implemented. This orientation is not shared by all 
sectors of society, however, and we are now witnessing well-organized 
opposition and challenge to the anticipated affects of the new Act on the 
business and industrial sectors of the economy. Many representatives of business 
across the country are collaborating to launch a court challenge of labour laws 
such as Manitoba's. These challenges are occurring on an obviously co-ordinated 
and concentrated basis in other provinces as well. All court challenges are based 
on the new Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as the Charter is viewed as a new 
vehicle with which the power of unions may be successfully challenged. 
It is worth noting that the first Annual Report of the Labour Board since the 
extensive amending of the Act is a separate document rather than a portion of 
the Department of Labour's Annual Report. It is a 60-page, comprehensive and 
informative document, much improved over the scant page it comprised in the 
department's report. 
The new document contains material that one might expect, but 
unfortunately seldom encounters, in the annual reports of quasi-independent 
agencies. The Labour Board Report contains a description of the administration 
of the Board, including the number and type (position) of staff employed, duties 
and overall operating budget. It also supplies information on the Board's library 
and a report on the Case Monitoring System. 
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The Case Monitoring System is a unique and valuable method of ensuring the 
timely dispatch of case Investigations and disposition. Other Manitoba 
Investigative agencies do not have a comparable monitoring system, and in the 
case of the Human Rights Commission at least, there is no established 
systematic way of assessing the handling of cases. 36 
The Labour Board's system is designed to provide the base of information 
necessary to assess and ensure efficient practices and procedures. The 
processing of each application is tracked as to the time spent on each stage. 
This is particularly important because time lines are prescribed in the 
legislation·and to exceed these time frames would constitute a contravention of 
the legislation. Where time frames are not established by legislation then 
standards are set. The monitoring process helps to ensure adherence. Any 
·overdue cases are reported with reasons given for the delay. Improvements in 
Board practices and procedures can then be made from a reliable data base. 
Although the Case Monitoring System is still in its infancy, it promises to 
become a useful management tool. It represents a response to the criticisms of 
some (e.g. Law Reform Commissions) that the processes of quasi-judicial bodies 
need to be re-vamped because they have generally become unresponsive to the 
public and are administratively cumbersome. 
The Board has another unique feature in contrast to what is found in other 
agencies. The Department of the Attorney-General has designated one of the 
lawyers from the Legal Services Branch as responsible for on-going legal 
assistance to the Labour Board. Such assistance relates primarily to advice on 
developments in jurisprudence, but also with respect to other legal issues: 
preparation of legal summaries which are required by statutes for the 
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Annual Report: representing the Board in judicial review proceedings; and as 
required for other reasons, such as in proceedings before the Court of Appeal. 
The designation of legal counsel for the Board is not only due to the volume of 
legal assistance required by the Board, but also because the intent of the 
legislation was that the Labour Board become an autonomous specialist 
tribunal. 31 
The Labour Board is particularly proud of its publications. They are 
mentioned here because they contribute in some measure to an accountability 
system, through the provision of information which is public and which is 
presented in a useful and clear format. These documents are: a tri-monthly 
report of statistics and other information of proceedings before the Board, a 
layperson's guide to the Manitoba Labour Relations Act, a tri-monthly report 
which summarizes all arbitration awards in the Province, whether through the 
expedited arbitration process or the conventional process, and finally, a 
tri-monthly report of the reasons of the Board for particular decisions. 
Many of the Board's decisions are of a type that would be expected 
following the passage of new legislation, particularly of new legislation which is 
much broader that its predecessor, which is the case with the Manitoba Labour 
Relations Act. One example is the Board's determination of the applicability of 
the Act to certain employees. 
Other decisions were required as well. It was also called upon to decide 
whether an agreement entered into with a predecessor employer was binding on a 
successor employer. Requests for exclusion of certain classifications of 
employee positions from the bargaining unit were also considered. Some matters 
were very unique - like the group of employees who protested that petitions 
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circulated by another group of employees were inaccurate and this unfairly 
resulted in support of the union. 
These examples are wide-ranging, but not all of the decisions are accepted 
by the parties involved. When this is the case, the matter may be appealed to . 
the Court of Queen's Bench. The Court could intervene if the decision of the 
Board was found to be "patently unreasonable or manifestly in error." JB It may 
also find on the jurisdiction of the Board. All areas of decisions made by the 
Board must be provided for In the Act, but the Court can also review decisions 
made not in accord with the Intent of the Act • 
. ; 
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Analysis 
The Manitoba Labour Board is similar to the Lotteries Foundation in two 
important respects; each agency has undergone major revision, involving changes 
to its legislated mandate which alter not only its goals and objectives, but also 
its structure and interaction with the public. In addition, in each agency the new 
policy thrust was and .continues to be controversial. The activities of both 
agencies are frequently the subject of media coverage and both receive ongoing 
attention from groups which oppose them. 
·They are certainly not identical, however. There are some obvious 
differences to the re-direction of these agencies which affect their relationship 
with all the elements of their environment. The changes to the Labour Board 
stem from a certain philosophical orientation, whereas the changes to the 
Lotteries Foundation were motivated primarily by pragmatism. This suggests 
that the opposition to the Labour Board (or more accurately, to the Act which it 
must enforce) will continue as long as there are those with differing philosophies 
and expectations of union-management relations. 
In fact, opposition to Manitoba's new Labour Relations Act is quite 
organized and extends to labour legislation in other provinces. The court 
challenges occurring in. several provinces involve.major corporations and have 
the support of Chambers of Commerce and other business organizations. No 
amount of "distancing" is likely to remove the perception that the legislation 
reflects the philosophy of the New Democractic Party, nor would that party have 
it any other way -- they are quite proud of the legislation. 
The fact that the decisions made by the Labour Board must fall within the 
- 61 -
well-defined provisions of all the Acts it enforces, in a sense does give the 
Government the !>est possible situation. The Act itself is the vehicle through 
which the Government has pursued one of its objectives, yet the existence of the 
Board does remove the Government from Involvement in any specific cases. Not 
becoming involved in any individual decision circumvents possible criticism of 
the Government on a specific case. 
Since the Board can only deal with the cases put before It and cannot 
decline to do so, there ls occasionally some difficulty in operating within their 
budget. The funds allotted to the Board for its first year of operation after 
proclamation of the new Act, were considerably less than requested. The 
remuneration requested for appointees to the Board was also less than expected, 
and for a period of time It looked like a compromise was not going to be 
reaChed. Board members were seriously threatening to resign, unless the 
Government raised the level of remuneration it was willing to offer, which It 
eventually did. 39 
The increased monies paid to these board members does not reflect the 
stated principle upon which remuneration ls based. Put simply, the basis Is that 
participation on a Provincial agency be recognized through remuneration of a 
token nature. It was never intended that·such remuneration replace, or compete 
with, what an individual could earn through his or her own endeavours. It is only 
an acknowledgment of public service. For those appointed to the Labour Board 
(and lncidently by many others), it is viewed differently. Most are lawyers from 
private practice who view their participation on the Labour Board as just another 
form of legal work for which they should receive adequate compensation: the 
concept of "public service" does not carry much weight. This point of view is 
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valid, but is diametrically opposed to the concept upon which remuneration is 
presently based. This dilemma has occurred with other agencies, but reached 
almost crisis proportions with the Labour Board. Since lawyers are relatively 
high wage earners in our society. initially the remuneration discrepancy was 
. quite wide. After much negotiation, the issue is now resolved. at least for the 
moment. 
The Labour Board shows accountability in a number of ways. First, all 
decisions are written, giving a full account of the case and the reasons behind 
each ruling. This written decision is public information. 
Second, all decisions are subject to review by the Courts, although such 
review must be within the eonstraints and requirements of the various Acts 
relevant to the case. Needless to say, Court review is also public. 
A third way in which the Board is accountable is through its case monitoring 
system •. This administrative practice "tracks" the progress of all cases, thus 
enabling the Registrar to assign investigative staff on a timely basis or take 
other action to ensure the expeditious disposition of each case. This simple but 
obvious measure was probably prompted by time requirements stipulated in the 
Labour Relations Act but it is an impressive measure when viewed as an example 
of accountability. Unfortunately, it is not a mechanism widely used by other 
agencies. 
The final evidence of how the Labour Board is accountable can be found in 
its Annual Report. These mandatory documents are usually notable by the 
absence of much useful data. More often than should be the case, only financial 
statements are found. Vet in the case of the Labour Board, the Annual Report 
contains a great deal more important information. These documents represent 
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an important way of reporting to the public through the Legislature and should 
always be comprehensive disclosures of the year's activities of the agency. 
Since ·Annual Reports are tabled in the Legislature, there is opportunity for 
individual Members to bring the content of the Reports to the attention of the 
public. 
There does not appear to be many reasons for the Labour Board to function 
much differently, from an administrative point of view, than it does at the 
present time. Although the Chairperson and others associated with its 
re-direction envisioned greater independence for the Board than is at present the 
case, these individuals did not offer a completely convincing case for greater 
independence at that time. Impartiality is the primary reason for creating a 
quasi-independent body to perform the particular function of the Labour Board, 
and the Government must be seen as not involved in its deliberations and 
decisions. However, that goal has been met -- the political arm of government 
has been removed. 
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Manitoba Arts Council 
The Manitoba Arts Council celebrated its twentieth anniversary in 1905. Its 
precursor was a volunteer committee formed by the Winnipeg Junior League, 
which functioned with the sole purpose of increasing the number of cultural 
activities within the city of Winnipeg. This involved soliciting donations from 
individuals and businesses, organizing cultural events and some lobbying of 
government. By 1965 however, the Provincial Government had passed legislation 
providing for the creation of the Manitoba Arts Council, with a province-wide 
mandate~ to promote the study, enjoyment, production and performance of works 
in the arts; This commitment also meant public funding for the arts community. 
The expansion of the mandate of the Junior League committee to that 
delegated to the Council represents significant growth. The soft-sell lobbying 
!Unction of the"Junlor League committee presented few of the problems that the 
far-reaChing Council would experience. 
The existence of the Junior League committee hOWf!ver, was a major factor 
in the government's decision to use a quasi-independent agency to continue 
efforts in the promotion of the arts. Particularly since a grant program was to 
be instituted, it was considered important that an independent peer body make 
funding decisions, based on artistic merit only. 40 It was considered 
inappropriate for elected politicians to make such judgments because of the 
concern they would not be well informed and might be guided by partisan 
considerations. 
During the twenty years since its establishment, the Arts Council funding 
program has grown, not only in dollars available but in the comprehensiveness of 
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the program itself. 
The primary activities undertaken by the Council to meet its mandate 
include the granting of money to individuals who are producing works of art, or 
performing; the provision of scholarships, loans or grants to citizens for stucy 
and research in the arts; and the presentation of awards to citizens of Manitoba 
for outstanding accomplishments. 
In order to make the best artistic judgments possible concerning grants, the 
Council has established a network of some 52 artists, critics and teachers from 
across Canada who act as Jurors or assessors for the review of each application 
for funding. The application process is complex. involving financial detail as 
well as purpose, justification and other program information. Council staff 
provide an analysis and Council members contribute an assessment of the artistic 
merit of the application; Operational grants involve a lengthy, one and one-half 
hour meeting with the applicant. Each application is reviewed thoroughly: the 
process is generally viewed as highly competitive. 41 
The Arts Council has established a complex. five-pronged network of 
programs with up to 50 components through which it carries out Its various 
activities. Th.e first program, which is by far the largest, is the Grants to 
Organizations Program. This area accounts for almost 70% of the Council's 
program budget. In l 98:S-84, $1. 7 million was distributed among six categories: 
dance, Interdisciplinary, literary, music and opera, theatre and the visual arts. 
In that year. these six categories supported :S4 organizations. 42 
A second major area of expenditure is the Arts Exposure Program. This 
program has two main components - Artists In the Schools {AlS) and Artists in 
the Communities. The first component was allocated the major share of this 
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portion of the budget, $189,39Z.OO to provide exposure of the arts to students 
and teachers in Manitoba Schools. This component enabled creative and 
performing artists to be placed in ZZ5 schools for workshops, demonstrations and 
performances during the 190:5-84 fiscal year. As in the grants program, AIS 
covers disciplines such as dance, interdisciplinary, literary, music and opera, 
theatre and visual arts. The allocation of $10,400.00 for the Artists in the 
Community component helped non-profit community groups hire professional 
artists to teach new or advanced skills within the community. 
Third is.support for the Creative Arts Program, which in 198:5-84 totalled 
$331,245.00. This program provides the most direct assistance to artists 
available from the Council. Besides providing support for artists at all levels of 
their artistic development, the program keeps the Council apprised of the 
direction and events of the various disciplines. The creative results of this 
funding include examples such as: short stories, sculptures, a walking tour 
guidebook, plays, poetry, ceramic and other pieces, paintings, films and 
videotapes. 
These grants are intended to assist practising artists in carrying out a 
well-defined project of a short-term nature such as study, workshops, exhibitions 
creative production. performance of original work and/or travel related to the 
artists' current work. Again this category covers all of the numerous 
disciplines. 4 3 
The Student Aid Program which was allocated $23,815.00 in 1983-84 is 
fourth out of six ma}or programs. lt is designed to provide financial assistance 
for study at institutions in Canada and abroad. Financial need is the primary 
factor taken into consideration when approvals under this program are made. 
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Also under this program is a scholarship component based on achievement 
through two institutions - the Western Board of Music and the Associated 
Manitoba Arts Festivals . 
. A fifth major program Is the Touring Program to which $101,209.00 was 
allocated in 1983-84. This program enables performing artists to offset costs 
incurred as a result of tours to rural and northern Manitoba. The program 
reduces the cost of offering performed services, which can be substantial In 
more remote areas of the province. 
The sixth and final program category is Special Projects. A total of 
$99,872.00 was provided to individual artists or organizations for new initiatives 
which do not fall within one of the established categories. Support was provided 
towards arts management, an experimental multi-media project and for a 
seminar on professional development in the arts •. 
The grant areas reflect a certain cultural policy, developed by the 
government and implemented by the Council. The current structure reveals an 
intent to fund smaller groups and individuals, rather than focussing entirely on 
the major arts groups such as the Symphony, Art Gallery, Ballet and Opera. This 
orientation represents a deviation from the focus of the previous administration. 
The shift reflects the NOP philosophy in favour of the so-called 
"democratization of culture•, making it more accessible to all segments of the 
society and, in theory, less elitist. While the Council provides direction and 
decisions based on artistic considerations, it ls the government which established 
the direction of Council's program. 
This complex and certainly ambitious network of programs is directed by a 
fifteen-member Council, assisted by a staff of five. The Council membership 
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reflects a wide variety of backgrounds in the arts field. The current Chair is a 
teacher of music and history. Other Council members include a filin maker, an 
artist, actress, an interior designer and an English professor. Also among the 
members is a labour administrator, an architect, a record store owner with 
· experience as a member of the Board of Directors of the Winnipeg Symphony 
Orchestra, a weaver, a teacher of Indian dance and theatre, a gallery owner, a 
rural artist and a public relations professional. 
One of the most confusing aspects of the use of a non-departmental agency 
as a tool for implementing government policy in the arts area, is how it 
interconnects with arts - related policies which fall under the Jurisdiction of the 
Department of Culture, Heritage and Recreation. 
This separation; although perhaps well-defined conceptually, is not as clear 
cut when put into practice. Since 1979, the Council has been responsible for 
professionally-based arts programs and the Department has delivered those 
which may be described as "community-based" (the larger community, not just 
the arts c:cimmunity). In actual practice, however, there is some overlap and 
potential for confusion. For example, the Artists In the Schools program puts 
professional artists (Council's jurisdiction) directly into schools (departmental 
jurisdiction) throughout the province: and the Ballet in the Park program puts 
dancers of the Winnipeg Royal Ballet (Council's Jurisdiction) into various 
Winnipeg parks (departmental jurisdiction) throughout the summer, which is a 
community-based concept. In the first example. the program is implemented by 
the Council: in the second case, the department has responsibility. 
This division appears somewhat arbitrary and it is not clear at all why either 
entity could not deliver the programs of the other. The jurisdictional split does 
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put pressure on the department and the Council to share policy planning 
information and in essence, they have to work at developing trust. The 
relationship does not easily, or automatically, involve trust. Perhaps there is 
some misplaced professional pride which results in attempts to protect one's 
"turf" as if the responsibilities accorded to one were a negative statement on the 
worth of the other. 
· The Arts Council budget is derived from two sources - a voted, appropriated 
amount ($1.5 million) and a variable amount from Lotteries revenue. The most 
recent figure from the lotteries is $2. l million. The greatest difficulty with 
lotteries monies was an initial distaste of the source. which has since been 
overcome, probably due to the increasing public acceptance and support of 
lotteries. 44 .A second area of concern is that lotteries money is variable and at 
preser:it it is coming in very quickly, but programs must be in place before the 
funds ca~ be allocated and used effectively. If.this is indeed a problem, it is 
surely one of the more pleasant ones. 
Council staff attend meetings and act as a resource but have no voting 
rights. Since staff are consultants to applicants, they have sufficient knowledge 
to be quite influential with Council. The consultant role with artists does assist 
in producing quality applications, in appropriate categories, all of which have 
artistic merit. 
The consultant is responsible for calling a. jury of peers, usually three in 
number, for assessing the application and making a recommendation to Council. 
Grants are discretionary, not a "right", and Council policy is to adopt almost a 
research and development approach to arts funding. That is, work must be 
original and reflect an interpretation of what the artist perceives. Much popular 
r 
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art would, not qualify, as it is an attempt to reflect what is actually seen, rather 
than an interpretation of what is seen. 
The Council sets administrative policy for staff of the organization, 
although the Executive Director has staffing authority without reference to 
Council. The Department of Culture, Heritage and Recreation works with 
Council administrative staff on the development of yearly estimates, which are 
presented to Treasury Board along with other estimates of expenditure via 
appropriations relevant to that department. 
The Arts Council also receives 25% of the net income generated by the 
Manitoba Lotteries Foundation. The actual amount ls variable, but the 
distribution of these monies, along with appropriated funds is fully disclosed by 
audit and published in the Council's Annual Report. 
Only about. four provinces in Canada use non-departmental bodies to 
distribute funds to the arts. The arts community in Manitoba has been 
supportive of this arrangement, primarily as the Council appears to be a smaller, 
more responsive body than a government department perhaps could be. There is 
a perception that there are fewer political overtones in the decision-making 
process, at least in the sense of direct involvement in the process by elected 
potlticans. However, some professional artists do report that they are 
interacting with an organized, structured body which is "political" in a negative 
sense, suggesting that appointed individuals and hired staff may be motivated by 
their own personal interests, rather than by a desire to Implement Council's 
mandate in a way consistent with Its Intent, objectively and professionally. 
Generally, however, the Council, Its staff and members of the arts 
community contacted, believe the Arts Council to be closer to the arts 
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community. Granting is more direct and flexible. If Council were not at least 
reasonably responsive, membe~ of the arts community would likely approach the 
Minister directly. In this way, the Council does play an important role as a · 
buffer between the Minister and the community. 
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Analysis 
There are many observations to be made about the Manitoba Arts Council 
but for purposes of this study, the most useful may be those which assist in 
comparing and contrasting this agency with others examined in the study. 
One of the most striking features of this agency is the length of time it has 
been in existence. This time period has enabled the Arts Council to establish its 
own credibility, both with the arts community and with the executive arm of 
government - at least to the extent that the relationship with the Minister 
responsible reflects that between the Council and Cabinet as a whole. 
It Is notable that at the present time the Minister who is responsible for the 
Arts Council is the same individualwho is responsible for Manitoba Lotteries 
Foundation, yet the relationship between the Minister and each of these agencies 
differs. The Minister attends about one meeting annually of the Arts Council 
and is not copied on minutes. Financial accountability ls largely post-facto 
reporting. This is not the case with the Lotteries Foundation. The Minister 
attempts to attend each monthly meeting of the Foundation, and according to 
the General Manager, actually does so about half the time. Financial reporting 
is ·on a much more frequent basis for the Foundation and provides a greater 
opportunity for input by the Minister. 
It has been stated that the Minister does not receive the minutes of Council 
meetings. The Minister responsible at the time requested a copy of all minutes, 
but was refused by the Chairperson who felt that to comply would put the 
agency's independence into question. 
If the primary benefit of receiving the minutes of Council meetings ls to 
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provide the Minister with a clearer understanding of Council's direction in order 
to influence it, there are certainly other ways of doing so. One example 
concerns the desire of the Minister (apparently reflecting the Government's 
policy direction in the arts) to increase arts activities in rural and northern 
areas. To accomplish this, new money was provided to the Council specifically 
for a touring program which would take performing artists into rural and 
northern communities. The Government could ensure the continuance of this 
program, or others designed with a similar purpose, by appointing a Council with 
many rural and northern members. 
If receipt of Council minutes is viewed as a necessary component of an 
accountability system. then the issue takes on a new significance. Regardless of 
how a Minister may choose to use the information communicated via minutes, 
. the mere fact of making them available is one way of showing how the Council is 
answerable to the elected representative who is ultimately responsible to the 
public, through the Legislature, for the actions of the Council. 
The argument agaim;t the provision of minutes to the Minister is two-fold. 
First, it may represent excessive Ministerial involvement with an agency which 
is intended to be at .arm's length from government. The arm's length 
relationship is an administrative arrangement that tends to be taken as a given 
after time, without much attention paid to the justification for the 
arrangement. · Insistence on independence can take precedent in the view of 
Council members .over a Minister's right and justified need to know about the 
activities of an agency for which he or she is responsible. 
A second argument is. that provision of minutes to the Minister may inhibit 
discussion at Council meetings. This may be true, although not all meeting 
r 
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proceedings need reflect detail on the various opinions expressed and by whom. 
The minutes of many types of organizations include only formal votes or 
decisions taken and not details of the preceeding discussions. 
At any rate, there is no reason why appointed members should not feel free 
to offer their comments at meetings, regardless of whether they are recorded. 
The process may encourage members to offer opinions which can be justified, 
rather than those which cannot. As this effect represents more responsible 
participation, any measure which supports it should be encouraged. lf the 
evidence of Individual responsibility Is great, then the support for external 
controls will lessen. In discussions with those who have been involved on or with 
appointed boards, there di:les seem to be a tendency for members to adopt a 
position whereby their removal' from ministerial direction and influence is 
strenuously upheld, even-to the point where the Minister is not kept Informed. 
Whereas this pcisitlon may be justified for some agencies, there is no clear reason 
(not ba5ed on personal political philosophy) why ·the same stance should be 
adopted in all cases. 
The reporting procedure with the Arts Council suggests, in a relative sense, 
a greater degree of Independence than that evidenced with some other agencies, 
even those of a greater level of responsibility in financial matters, such as the 
Lotteries Foundation. . , . 
Although the reasbns for this difference may be more complex than at first 
appears; it is likely that the greater age of the Arts Council has afforded it the 
time to become established, earn credibility with the arts community and to 
develop administrative effectiveness. Contact between Council staff and the 
bureaucracy tends to be limited to concerns over annual Estimates matters and 
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some items which require Treasury Board approval. Normally, the Council would 
not seek Treasury Board approval of most expenditure items, but there are some 
exceptions. One example is the current restraint on staffing levels. This type of 
e>ependiture is controlled by Treasury Board for the Arts Council as it is for 
departments. Like many departments with staffing authority delegated to it by 
. the Civil Service Commission, the Council is responsible for the mechanics of its 
own hiring, but may only do so when properly authorized. 
The Arts Council does show accountability in an interesting and unique way. 
All grant decisions - on the recipient and the amount of money granted, are 
.made by a jury of peers for that sector of the arts. This involvement results in a 
more direct accountability to the client group served by.the Council. It does 
not.,howeyer, satisfy accountability needs to the public as a whole. 
It is clear that a government department could set up a jury-of-peers 
system to administer the granting of funds allocated to the arts • 
. Administratively. there is no reason to believe it could not worl<. In fact, the 
Council's method of delivering its many programs is as complex and confusing as 
any. government departmental program is often accused of being, at least in the 
minds of mo~t of the general public. 
·. Why then was the quasi-independent form chosen for this purpose? lt is 
likely that .the existence of the Junior League's committee prior to creation of 
the Council, suggested to the politi<:ians of the day. that continuance of a . 
somewhat independent body would be politically wise. It would provide an 
opportunity for continued involvement by previously active citizens. The 
Council would also have the potential, and now does in fact, to.act as a buffer 
between the government and the public. Over time, the Council has 
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developed its own credibility with its client group and there is no reason for the 
government to alter an arrangement which works fairly well. 
Administratively, the Arts Council is not without problems. however. 
Recipients and observers of the Council have found Its network of funding 
programs incredibly and unnecessarily complex. lt is no wonder that applicants 
need a consultant (this is the actual title of staff) to assist them in the 
application and assessment process. The entire process may Justify the use of 
the phrase "bureaucratic red-tape" so often adopted by a bewildered public. 
Vet. one of the most often-cited reasons for using the quasi-independent form to 
achieve'a public goal is so that the alleged inherently cumbersome 
administration of departmental programs can be avoided. , 
'Another, very reluctantly admitted problem concerns the difficulty of the 
Council to reSPQnd quickly to a rapidly increasing allotment of lotteries 
revenue. 
45 Although the percentage of lotteries money to be provided to the 
Council Is a given, the actual dollar amount is not known too far in advance. 
Although no funds are unspent, there is a scramble to allocate the monies. It Is 
not clear whether the Council does not have enough programs in place (this is 
doubtful) or whether there are not enough consulting staff available to assist 
applicants, or whether there are simply not enough potential recipients 
requesting funding. Whatever the cause, the short supply of monies available for 
other public purposes suggests that there should be some serious evaluation of all 
Government needs versus all of the funds available. 
A final important point concerns the way the Government provides policy 
direction to the Council. The current administration in the early period of Its 
first term, decided that a greater portion of Arts money should go to the 
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northern regions of the province. Rather than simply giving that direction. as it 
would have been met and viewed as "political interference", the Government 
announced a new program, to be administered by the Arts Council. That 
program is the "Northern Tour" and has a specific amount of funds allocated to• 
it. The Council has no choice but to deliver the program (which suggests one of 
the possible reasons for the complex networl< of programs}, but curiously, it is 
not held in very high regard by the Council. There has been some informal 
discussion on discontinuing it, although this is not a feasible position given the 
Government's support of it. It may be that the program ls not viewed as one of 
Council's favourites because it was not initiated by Council or its staff. or 
perhaps it is not a very "good" program (as defined by the Council). It is clear, 
though, that the program could be sabotaged, even subconsciously, by a Council 
not committed to its success. The problem with the tour program may have been 
caused by insufficient consulting by the Government, although there Is no 
evidence of this. It is not likely that the Council could have declined to 
administer the program and would probably not have wished to attempt that 
course of action without solid reasons. Declining the program would have meant 
declining "new" funds, which is a difficult position to adopt by a group which 
must respond to the lobbying activities of the arts community. 
This final comment on the Arts Council then, relates to the issue of policy 
direction by the Government and the Council's answerabllity to the Government 
on its administration. The matter of formal reporting is part of this issue. Both 
these matters are central to the problematic relationship of agencies and 
government In general, but are exemplified by the Arts Council. 
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Manitoba Apprenticeship and Trades Qualifications Board 
The authority for the creation of the Apprenticeship and Trades 
Qualifications Board ("Trades Board" or "Board" is the short form) is contained in 
subsection :5(1) of The Apprenticeship and Trades Qualifications Act. Although 
the existence of such a board is not mandatory - the enabling legislation only 
authorizes its establishment but does not require it - the Board has been in 
existence for approximately forty-two years. Its precursor was known as the 
Apprenticeship and Tradesmen's Qualifications Board, but its name (along with 
others) was revised by The Equal Rights Statute Amendment Act in the 1985-86 
legislative session. · 
In order to meet its objectives, the Board works with a number of trade 
advisory committees and the Apprenticeship Branch within the Department of 
Labour. This three..:pronged arrangement is a result of a Federal Government 
initiative following the end of World War II. At that time there was a 
tremendous push to create job training and employment opportunities for 
enlisted men returning from the war: organization of the trades was part of that 
effort. This 0ccurred in all of the provinces, and few deviations have been made 
in the arrangement since then. 
In accordance with its Act, the Board has a permissive function in two 
areas. It may, although it is not required, make recommendations to the 
Minister on controls designed to regulate and improve the requirements for 
training, testing and certification in any designated trade. Recommendations in 
this area may be initiated by the Board or may be requested of the Board by the 
Minister. 
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The second permissive function concerns the trade advisory committees. 
Although these committees are distinct from the Board itself, the Board may 
make recommendations on who should be appointed to any one of them. The 
function of the advisory committees is primarily of a technical nature: more 
detail on their role and relationship to the Board will follow later in this section. 
The Board has mandatory responsibilities as well. These relate to the 
requirement of the Board to hear and determine appeals made under the Act. 
These appeals usually involve the denial of apprenticeship status to an individual, 
disputes over the granting of credits for previous training, and the issuance of 
qualification certificates or temporary permits. Curiously, although some 
activities of the Board are mandatory, the existence of the Board itself is not. 
Perhaps it is not an important detail, but it is conceptually inconsistent to have a 
Board whose existence is not mandatory when some of its legislative functions 
are, particularly when the same piece of legislation covers both the Board and 
the functions for which it is responsible. 
· An appeal would certainly require the Board to meet, but outside of that 
situation, there is no statutory minimum number of times the Board must 
convene. This is contrary to the provision in the Act for the advisory 
committees, which must by law meet at least twice per year. Needless to say, 
this requirement is easily met by all committees. It is interesting to note, 
however, that the Trades Board.has not met as a groUP in over two years, 
although there has been correspondence and contact by telephone between 
members, the Chairperson and the advisory committees and between the 
Chairperson and the Apprenticeship Branch within the Department of Labour. 
The Board derives most of its technical assistance from the trade advisory 
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committees. There are 28 of them at the present time, one for each of the 
designated· trades: boilermaker, bricklayer, carpenter, construction electrician, 
cook, crane operator; drywall mechanic. glazier, heavy duty equipment 
mechanic. industrial electrician. industrial welder, lather, industrial instrument 
mechanic, machinist and tool and die maker, miner, motor vehicle body repairer 
(paint), motor vehicle body repairer (metal), motor vehicle mechanic, painter and 
decorator, plumber, power electrician, refrigeration and air conditioning 
mechanic, steel fabricator, roofer, sheet metal worker, sprinkler fitter and 
steamfitter. These committees are comprised of individuals actually working in 
or qualified at the trade, either as employee or employer representatives. 
The advisory committees are subordinate to the Trades Board, at least 
formally. The Act states that the committees will report to the Board. and the 
Chairperson of the Trades Board confirms this relationship. 
In other ways, it can be seen that "superior-subordinate" relationship 
implied by that subsection of Act is not the reality. The Board may make a · 
recommendation to the Minister concerning appointments to the various 
committees. but in practice, suggested appointees tend to come from other 
46 sources. 
The interaction between the committees and the Branch is extensive and, 
more to the point,·direct. The Board is not even used as a "go-between", even 
though it is intended to be responsible for ·directing· the committees. 
The significant difference between the duties of the committees and the 
Board, is that the committees exist to provide technical advice on the trades to 
the Board, while the Board is responsible for more general matters either in the 
form of policy recommendations to the Government or concerning the 
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implementation of an approved course of action. 
,The subjects which might be covered by the committees are course 
curriculum, examinations, training requirements and certification matters. 
They meet approximately twice per year, more often for a newly-designated 
trade, and although they are not policy-makers, their review and 
recom,mendations result in appropriate and timely regulations on their trade. 
The committees are viewed by the Board, departmental officials and Ministerial 
staff as providing a significant contribution to the development of the 
apprenticeship program. 
: The other major player in this area is the Apprenticeship Branch within 
Manitoba Labour. The Branch Is responsible for the provision of support services 
to the trade advisory committees and the Trades Board and generally acts as the 
administrative link or liaison between the bureaucracy and these arms-length 
bodies. 
The Apprenticeship Branch also acts as the liaison between the Board and its 
advisory committees. In this respect, the Branch reports to the Board on behalf 
of the committees and presents their recommendations, together with supporting 
research and documentation. The minutes of all committee meetings are made 
available to the Board, through the Branch which is in first receipt of them. This 
flow seems odd, but it probably developed for the convenience of both the Board 
and its committees •. It should be recalled that they meet independently of one 
another and it is the Branch which provides the typing and copying service for 
th,e committees. 
The Branch also follows up on committee matters not resolved, keeps the 
committees informed of decisions and recommendations of the Board and is 
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responsible for keeping committee membership current. This last responsibility 
involves consultation with the Minister's office when appointments are near to 
expiry and soliciting recommendations from the Board, although 
recommendations are not always forthcoming. 47 
· Other branches of the Department also assist in meeting Board objectives, 
largely through the co-ordinating efforts of staff of the Apprenticeship Branch. 
For example, the Research and Planning Branch has provided comprehensive 
working position papers on several issues related to apprenticeship, conducted 
surveys in the various trades and has also drafted preliminary regulations as an 
assist to the Trades Board. 
The reason given by the Board's Chairperson for the extensive involvement 
of the Apprenticeship Branch is that the Board has no staff under its own control 
to draw on for duties presently handled by the Branch. However, this is a weak 
explanation, since only one, half-time research assistant of the Branch's total 
staff complement is allotted to the Board. Presumably, the Board could call on 
the Research and Planning Branch for assistance. 
The composition of the Board differs from that of other agencies in two 
respects. First, it is comprised solely of men, probably due to the only relatively 
recent success of women in the trades. As the participation of women grows, it 
is expected that apprenticed female tradespeople will also be appointed to the 
Board. The other deviation concerns the criterion of geographic representation 
reflected in most other agencies. For some reason not identified by any of those 
interviewed, the composition of the Board strongly favours Winnipeg and 
Brandon, to the exclusion of rural and northern areas. Yet, apprenticed 
tradespeople are certainly found in other regions of the province. 
- 8:5 -
Membership of the Board, at present totalling seven, does reflect a 
labour-management mix. departmental representation and the concern for 
training. Two individuals are from employee organizations, two are employers, 
two are from the Department of Labour and one member is drawn from the 
post-secondary division of the Department of Education. All appointments are 
staggered, so that appointment of an entirely new slate is never required: there 
will always be some experienced members on the Board when new ones are 
appointed. These appointments are all "at pleasure" (even most of the term 
appointments to the Board). meaning there is no guarantee of tenure for the 
duration of the appointment: however, they are also all appointed "until a 
successor is appointed", thus providing for continuity past the stated term for 
any length of time. should the appointment of new members be delayed for any 
reason. 
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Analysis · 
The point about the Apprenticeship and Trades Qualifications Board which 
demands explanation is the fact that the Board has not met as a group in over 
two years. Yet, the Trade Advisory Committees have met and the 
Apprenticeship Branch is certainly very active. Work has been done on new 
trades; cooks, bakers and parts people have been designated as apprenticed 
trades within the last two years, while work done on air balancers led to a 
decision that designation as an apprenticed trade was not appropriate. The issue 
is that there is activity in the trades field at this time, but the Apprenticeship 
and Trades Qualific::ations Soard is not involved. The reason for this is not 
obvious, and all possible explanations of this situation need to be explored. 
The Chairperson has claimed that the Government lacks interest in the 
Board for two reasons. First, the area ls essentially "boring" and second, the 
current restraint program inhibits new activity. It is true that the apprenticed 
trades are not particularly controversial at the present time - other than 
concerning the issues.of unemployment and the entry of women - but it is not a 
fair comment to conclude that the lack of controversy means that the area Is not 
. . 
of interest to the Government. If that were the case, we would not have seen 
any reorganization or increase in funding (albeit, small) for the Apprenticeship 
Branch. Further questioning of the Chairperson resulted in his admission that it 
was he who lacked interest in the area. Furthermore, it is not necessary for the 
Government (through the Branch) to call meetings of the Board, although it can 
certainly do so. The point is. however, that the Chairperson is well within his 
responsibilities to initiate meetings, studies, policy reviews or other activities if 
r 
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he so wishes. Staff of the Apprenticeship Branch have expressed dissatisfaction 
with the current Chairperson's performance and certainly feel that the Board 
should be playing a more active and useful role. 48 The opinion of Branch 
personnel may not reflect that of the Government. It remains to be seen 
whether the Government will make changes in the membership of the Board, or 
take other action to ensure a more productive body. 
A second reason given by the Chairperson in support of his claim that the 
Government lacks interest in the Trades Board is the restraint program. Without 
reasonable funding, an appointed body cannot do the necessary research and 
survey.required to develop well-grounded recommendations. However. the 
Trades Board has the Research Branch of the Department of Labour at its 
disposal, and this branch is better resourced that most research units in other 
departments. The Branch, which has as.its focus the concerns of the trades in 
general and in particular those with formal apprenticeship programs also 
provides considerable support. As partial fulfilment of their mandate, much 
research and consultation with affected groups has been done, which need not be 
duplicated by the Board. There was no evidence that staff of the Branch felt in 
any way competitive with the Board, although admittedly. the Board is in no 
position to threaten even the most self-preserving of officials. 
Perhaps a more likely explanation for the Board's inactivity, although the 
Chairperson's ennui is undeniably a factor, is that the major policy issues 
surrounding the trades have been settled or can be ably dealt with by Branch or 
Ministerial staff. Although the advisory committees are intended to provide only 
technical advice and are only four or five members each, there is no reason to 
believe they could not capably respond to policy issues if such matters were put 
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to them. 
The advisory committees, the Branch and the Minister's office are perhaps 
not the most appropriate bodies to deal with the appeal function, also a 
responsibility of the Board. The advisory committee may be too close to the 
matters which are under appeal, such as: criteria for granting apprenticeship 
status, credits, certification or temporary permits. The involvement of the 
committees in the development of these rules and regulations may inhibit their 
ability to be impartial. The Branch also may not be viewed as impartial and the 
Minister would likely be lacking the technical background. This then, is a 
rationale for continuing the Board. As an appeal body is necessarily 
respans&-orientated, it may justifiably meet infrequently, if appeals are 
infrequent. 
The Branch does deliver the apprenticeship program effectively and plays a 
co-ordinating role with the trades public. the advisory committees, the Research 
Branch and the Board in doing so. The mandate of the Branch has grown since 
the inception of the Board and given its success in meeting the objectives of that 
mandate, there is no reason to suggest a larger role for the Board. 
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license Suspension Appeal Board 
First established in 1959, the License Suspension Appeal Board is provided 
for under section 25:5 of The Highway Traffic Act. It functions as an appeal 
body, hearing appeals of the decision to suspend drivers• licences: other 
suspensions, cancellations or denials of driving school permits, driving school 
instructor permits, automobile dealer permits and salesperson permits. The 
responsibility for hearing appeals from individuals who have had their driver's 
license suspended is by far the Board's most time-consuming activity and the one 
which attracts the greatest interest from the public. The Act also gives 
jurisdiction to the Board over most court-ordered suspensions. An exception is a 
suspension concerning a juvenile, which must be so authorized by the Juvenile 
cour.t rather than the Board. Decisions of the License Suspension Appeal Board 
may be further appealed to the Provincial Court. where its decision is final. 
Another area in which the Board has no jurisdiction, is over suspensions of 
drivers licences made on medical grounds, such as epilepsy, heart disease and 
eyesight problems. Appeals in these cases must be through an agency specially 
established to review appeals of suspensions made for this reason. The Medical 
Review Committee is comprised of qualified medical specialists, whereas the 
License Suspern;ion Appeal Board is made up of a broader range of citizens, who 
do not possess medical qualifications. 
Since suspensions involve drivers from all areas of the Province, hearings 
are held in seven locations. These are: Winnipeg, Brandon, Dauphin, Steinbach, 
Beausejour, The Pas and Thompson. Most hearings usually last a half-day and 
deal with about twelve applications, although approximately eighteen is a more 
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likely number to be heard in Winnipeg. The frequency of hearings in each 
location varies, depending on the work load. For example. hearings are normally 
held weekly in Winnipeg, bi-weekly in Brandon, monthly in Dauphin, Steinbach 
and Beausejour and about every six weeks in The Pas and Thompson. 
The Board consists of ten individuals who reside in various locations 
throoghciut the province. This makes travelllng to hearings less onerous when the 
members attending the hearings live in nearby towns. At least two appointed 
members are required by legislation to attend each hearing, however, the 
Minister has requested that at least three members attend; this is always done 
unless one of the scheduled members is unable to make the hearing and a 
replacement cannot be found in time. In this case, the missing member is 
briefed on· all the cases heard and participates in the final decision. · One staff 
member alsci attends each hearing. All members, on a rotating basis, attend 
hearings held in WinniJ)eg. 
· The work load for the ten-member Board during 198:5 was substantial. A 
total of 3,889 applications were received, requiring :524 hearings. Most were 
dealt with, but 322 applications were still pending or cancelled by the conclusion 
of 1983. 
The process of reviewing the suspension is quite thorough. Each applicant's 
record is checked to ensure that no charges are pending or that the applicant has 
no unpaid fines. Any decision of the Board can be vetoed by the Registrar of the 
Vehicles Registration Branch of the Department of Highways and Transportation, 
although this tends to happen for "technical" reasons, such as unpaid fines or 
pending charges. The Registrar does have veto power, however, and could use it 
in any case as he sees fit. 
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In its review of applications before it, the Board takes the position that a 
driver's license is a privilege, not a right and although the Board tries to help 
individuals, successful appeals of a suspended driver's license are far from 
automatic and tend to allow only limited driving privileges. Many of the 
individuals who do not fare so well before the Board have missed this point and 
have failed to realize that they must demonstrate why they need to drive a 
vehicle. Some tend to feel that the Board can reverse the Court's "mistake". 
The main criterion in the decision to restore a driver's license is that "the 
public interest" must be served. In this respect, the attitude of the applicant is 
important. Although, "attitude" can be a nebulous criterioo, the Board is looking 
for some indication that the circumstances which led to the suspension of the 
license will not be repeated. For example, if alcohol was involved, the Board 
will require the applicant to receive treatment from the Alcoholism Foundation 
of Manitoba and submit a "clearance" from the Foundation. Although some 
drivers have complained that this is an infringement of their personal rights, the 
Board has held to this requirement. The number of previous suspensions is also 
considered as part of the "in the public interest" check. 
A second criterion is whether suspension of the driver's license represents 
exceptional hardship to the individual. Is the person required to drive as part of 
his or her work responsibilities? Driving to and from work is not considered 
necessary, unless bus service.is not available. Job requirements are not the only 
consideration made as part of the "exceptional hardship" criterion. however.-· If· 
the individual's spouse does not drive, limited use of driving privileges may be 
granted to the suspended driver. which may include, for example, three hours on 
a Saturday to buy groceries, or trips to keep a doctor's appointment if no other 
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form of transportation is available, and so on. Each case is judged on its 
individual merits and all claims made by applicants are thoroughly checked, 
either by Board members or by staff. 
All applicants are advised of the Board's decision within seven working days, 
by registered mail. This time frame is reasonable, but the success the Board has 
in meeting this deadline is due largely to the staff. which has grown in recent 
years to a tOtal of five full-time personnel. The cuITent Chairperson also 
deserves recognition for his significant work. He comes in to the Board office 
every morning and stays at least the half-day but often much longer. This ls in 
spite of the expected commitment of two days per week for this Board. 49 
The Board itself is comprised of an interesting mix of eleven people. Two 
are non-driver$ (both women); three are farmers (one ls female); two are retired; 
two are business people and four are women who are housewives. These 
members represent Winnipeg (five), Thompson, Dauphin, Brandon, Beausejour and 
La Broquiere. Three are Franco-phones and five others speak another language 
besides English. specifically, Dutch, Ukrainian and German. None of the current 
members are Native. 
Attendance tends to vary with the location of the hearing, which rotates 
among seven cities. As attendance varies, so does the task of chairing the 
hearings, giving all members an opportunity to preside. 
Annual budgeting can be difficult, as the agency is response-oriented and 
cannot dictate how many cases will be heard. The right of individuals to appeal 
the suspension of their driver's license (or other licenses the Act covers) is 
established by legislation and that appeal must be heard within a reasonable 
amount of time. The budget estimate is based on the number of licenses 
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granted, which is known and the number of licenses suspended, which is also 
known. Based on previous experience, the percentage of suspensions which will 
be appealed is estimated. The request for financial and human resources is then 
based on that figure. 
The rationale for giving this appeal function to a quasi-independent body ls 
to provide impartiality. SO Still, some decisions of the Board have been 
questioned by the Minister. The basis of the Minister's concern has always been 
that he would not in all cases grant the minimum (ie: most restrictive) class of 
license, a position the Board has consistently adopted. The Minister has felt that 
on occassion, the Board has been unnecessarily limiting in the extent of driving 
privileges restored. The queries raised by the Minister were prompted by 
complaints to him from individuals whose cases before the Board were not 
successful. The agency is moderately well-known by the public, its decisions not 
controversial. However, the low-key profile of the Board is probably not 
because its decisions are always popular. Most often it is an individual's desire 
(and right) to keep the matter of the suspension of his or her driver's license as 
private as possible. even when an appeal of the suspension is not successful. 
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Analvsis 
A surprising fact about the License Suspension Appeal Board is that it is the 
only one of its kind in Canada. No other province has created an Independent 
body to hear appeals against the suspension of a driver's (or other) license. As 
this agency.has been in existence for l6 years, through New Democratic as well 
as Progressive Conservative administrations. it is likely to stay. Most other 
provinces have no appeal function whatsoever: in some provinces, the Minister 
can hear appeals of a suspended driver's license in limited situations, such as 
suspension ordered by the. Registrar due to the number of convictions. 
Manitoba's law was prompted by a desire to allow individuals the opportunity to 
keep their jobs. where driving was required. Regardless of the original motive 
behind creation of the Board sixteen years ago, two new developments in recent 
years have had. or may have in the future a major impact on the Board. 
First is the more rigid penalty now in effect for driving while impaired. The 
first such conviction results in a three-month suspension, with no right to appeal 
for even a restricted-use license. On a second conviction, the suspension is for a 
six-month period, with the right to apply to the License Suspension Appeal Board 
for a restricted-use license for the last three months of the suspension only. The 
first three months must pass without use of a vehicle. The merits of these 
changes aside, the point is that they do restrict the power of the Board, where 
previously there was no such restriction. 
A second development which complicates the functioning of the Board is the 
increasing use of plea-bargaining. The acceptance of a lesser charge in exchange 
for a guilty plea adds a twist to a case which may end up before the Board. 
' 
,, 
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Based on a narrow or strict interpretation of the Board's mandate, it must 
respond to the actual conviction only, yet morally perhaps the Board should 
consider the fact that the driver was impaired. The obvious problem with the 
"moral" approach is the possible unfairness to the applicant, but viewing the case 
in this way may be justified as in the public interest. It will be interesting in the 
coming months to see how the Board responds to these challenges. Without 
doubt these developments have already had an affect on the Board at least 
insofar as.they are concerned about the matter and see it as problematic. The 
issue is still relatively new and its major impact, which may alter the character 
of the Board permanently, is yet to come. 
As stated earlier, the Minister responsible for the Board has questioned 
some decisions, which could be viewed as interference. 51 However, the 
Chairperson insists that such ministeria!'queries to date have consisted of 
simple requests for background information pertaining to a particular decision 
and discussion of the actual decision, rather than being attempts to influence 
such decisions. Still, this practice could be misunderstood. Many people feel 
that no exChange between the Minister and the Board is warranted, since 
direction on individual cases (even subtle influence)'is out of line. To exercise 
sueh influence would be an abuse of power. Others may feel that since the 
Minister, and Cabinet collectively, 'are responsible for all agencies whiCh 
consume'public funds and carry out a public purpose, then the Minister not only 
has a right but a duty to keep informed of the activities of all its · 
responsibilities. This may require policy direction to an agency, although 
involvement in a specific decision may be avoided, depending on the nature of 
the·agency's mandate. 
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Another view of Ministerial involvement in an agency such as the License 
Suspension Appeal Board is that it can provide much-needed direction concerning 
the process of appeals before the Board. Procedure before these bodies must be· 
fair and consistent and be seen as such. In fact, successful appeals of Board 
decisions in the Court of Queen's Bench are usually based on evidence that due 
process was in some way denied the applicant in question. Most certainly, the 
Minister would be criticized in the Legislature if the agency was found to be 
lacking fair and reasonable procedures, in spite of the concept of procedural due 
process developed through the courts. It is likely though, that such criticism 
w'ould not be too•serious, unless there was a persistent pattern of arbitrary or 
unfair procedues; The example given earlier of the Minister's direction that 
three Board members be present at every hearing, rather than only two as 
stipulated in the legislation, is an example of direction that should be viewed 
positively, rather than as "interference". It is ministerial involvement in the 
decisions on individual applications that must be avoided, in order to preserve 
the integrity of the Board. It should be remembered that one of the reasons for 
using the quasi-independent form to perform this public function is to ensure 
impartiality, and the appearance of it, in the decision-making process • 
. A major concern which has arisen during the review of this agency is the 
effect of the close physical proldmity of the Board's offices to the Vehicle 
Registration Branch {and other branches of the same division) of the Department 
of Highways and Transportation. In fact, they are aU Located in the same 
building. While the decision to house these units together was made for 
convenience - mostly for the public but also for departmental administrative 
purposes. it does have a serious side-effect. In the minds of most of the public, 
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the License Suspension Appeal Board is still "the government". The reality of 
impartiality and independence is compromised by this arrangement. The Board 
may make the point to applicants that it is not subject to government control (in 
the decision-making process), but the image will persist. The Minister 
responsible for the Board does receive a number of direct approaches from 
members of the public, who view the function as very much a part of a 
• 52 
government department. 
This image is further reinforced by the inclusion of the Board's "Annual 
Report" in that of the department. The portion allocated to the Board is brief, 
almost exclusively statistical in content and hardly a good example of 
accountability of a quasi-independent, non-governmental body. Like the public 
reporting of the Apprenticeship Trades and Qualifications Board, much is left to 
be desired. The comment is two-fold: first the Report is not an independent 
document and second. it does not contain a full and reasonable accounting of the 
Board's yearly activities. 
CHAPTER V 
'C' AGENCIES 
Overview 
In one sense, the 'C' category of agency is the most homogeneous of the 
three, as the main function of each is advisory. As distinct from 'B' category 
advisory agencies, the range of topics that any one of these agencies may be 
reSPonsible for is much narrower. For example, the Advisory Medical Board to 
the Cancer Treatment and Research Foundation, although obviously extremely 
"'1' 
important, does not have as many areas of advisory responsibility as the 
Manitoba Intercultural Council or the Advisory Council on the Status of Women. 
Taken as a group, however, the advisory mandates of 'C' agencies span many 
topics. The Government has appointed advisory bodies in economic. business, 
industrial and employment areas. The Agricultural Employment Development 
Committee, Destination Manitoba Program Review Committee, the Minimum 
Wages Board, the Tourism Industry Organization Advisory Committee and the 
· Venture Capital Advisory Board are all examples. 
Other areas cover education, natural resources, agriculture and the trades. 
Some of these bodies are: the Curriculum Review Council, Education Advisory 
Board, several Conservation District Commissions, the Saskeram Wildlife 
Management Area Advisory Committee, the Agricultural Societies Advisory 
Board, the Artificial Insemination Advisory Board, the Dairy Board, the 
Pesticides and Fertilizer Advisory Committee, examining boards for 
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electricians, hairdressers, barbers. and gas and oil fitters, and the Labour 
Management Review Committee. 
Sorrie 'A' and 'B' agencies have a number of advisory committees reporting 
to them which are classified within this category. The Natural Products 
Marketing Council has 17 producer boards reporting to the Council covering 
every animal and vegetable produced in Manitoba in which marketing Is 
regulated, from hogs, chickens, turkeys, eggs, honey and milk to vegetable and 
root crops such as sugar beets, potatoes, cauliflowers and broccoli. 
The Apprenticeship and Trades Qualifications Board is similar. It has an 
advisory committee reporting to it on every designated trade in the province. 
Although appointments to these advisory committees are made by the 
Lieutenant-Governor in Council and are remunerated from public funds, they 
·are, at least in theory, controlled by the Apprenticeship and Trades 
Qualifications Board. This contrasts with the producer boards which, although 
directed by the Marketing Council, its members are appointed to it by the 
Council rather than the Lieutenant-Governor in Council. and are paid from funds 
of the producer board. 
Government-established advisory agencies are quite numerous. If the 
producer and trades advisory boards are counted individually and not lumped 
together as only two separate bodies, which is often the practice, then there are 
at least 60 of these agencies. Advisory agencies comprised solely of civil 
servants are not Included in this count, even those involving all three levels of 
·government. The exact number is more difficult to determine precisely than it 
is for other categories because many inactive ones are not formally 
disestablished, and although no longer functional, they remain "on the books". 53 
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Most advisory agencies are established in a simple manner -- the Minister 
responsible for the area creates the agency and appoints members to it by 
letter. Usually this process is described as "Ministerial Letter" and because of 
the rather ad-hoc nature of the process, Ministerial aides or departmental staff: 
often do not bother to disestablish an agency whose purpose has been met or 
which has become inactive. 
Other advisory agencies are established by Treasury Board, Cabinet, by a 
Federal-Provincial or other agreement or by legislation. Where created by 
legislation, usually establishment of the agency is permissive, but there are cases 
where establishment of the advisory body is mandatory. The Minister's Soard on 
Mental Health is an example. At the time the enabling legislation was drafted in 
1965, the existence of such a body was thought to be of enough Importance that 
Its existence must be made a legislated requirement. 54 
These agencies maintain a low profile compared to •A• and 'B' agencies. It 
is likely that the normally technical or routine nature of their advice usually 
results in a minimum of controversy. Although •c• agencies may be 
characterized as usually non-contentious, their function is highly regarded, both 
by the political and bureaucratic arms of government. ·The input of experts is 
valued, but the participation of members of the public Is also of major 
importance. 
The membership of these agencies is largely drawn from the relevant 
industry or occupational community. For example, the Electricians' Board of 
Examiners is comprised of electricians, the Hairdressers' Board of Examiners is 
hairdressers and so on. Other criteria are also considered: geographic 
representation, a rural-urban mix and ethnic and gender factors. 
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,Since these agencies are not normally involved in program delivery and 
those with a larger research responsibility are classified as a 'B' agency, their 
budgets are minimal or nil. Remuneration and out-of-pocket expenses are 
usually paid from a departmental appropriation and any requirement for clerical 
assistance is also usually supplied by the department. The appointed members of 
the agency only supply verification of attendance at meetings and expense 
claims for reimbursement purposes to the department's administration branch. 
Other reporting is made directly to the Minister or the Deputy Minister. 
The level of remuneration made to members of advisory agencies is quite 
low and in some cases it is nil or confined to reimbursement of out-of-pocket 
e>q>enses only. Expense reimbursement must be in line with that provided for 
civil servants, unless other arrangements are authorized by Order-in-Council. 
This does not occur in very many situations, but the Chairperson of the Advisory 
Council on the Status of Women did receive such approval for reimbursement of 
child care expenses, a provision which is not available to civil servants or 
appointees to other agencies. A fairly accurate average of remuneration for this 
category is $60.00 per day for the members and $85.00 for chairperson. 
Administration of 'C' agencies is straight-forward because most matters are 
handled by the department. The only common difficulty is the tendency for 
members to make errors concerning travel and related expenses, due to 
unfamiliarity with the civil service rules and regulations which govern these 
e><penditures. 
The following section of this chapter is a case study of the Council on 
Aging. This agency was chosen for two reasons. First, it has a rather large 
annual budget for agencies of this type. Second, it is the only advisory agency 
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Which reports (functionally as well as formally) to a civil servant rather than 
directly to a Minister (or Deputy Minister or designate). 
, 
' 
' 
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Council oo Aging 
. The Council on Aging was created in 1980 by a decision of Cabinet, to 
provide an advisory function regarding the aged and the aging papulation of 
Manitoba. In order to understand the Council fully, an explanation of the role of 
the Provincial Gerontologist is first necessary. 
The Provincial Gerontologist is a public official who is charged with the 
responsibility of providing advice, consultation services and policy and program 
information on gerontological matters to senior governmental staff, 
departmental officials, community organizations, educators and the general 
public. In so doing, the gerontologist interacts with liaison officers appointed by 
each provincial department and appropriate Crown Corporations to deal with 
interdepartmental issues related to aging. 5 5 
The effectiveness of the Provincial Gerontologist is at least partially 
dependent upon how responsive that individual can be to the needs of the client 
group - Manitoba's elderly. Her role then, is enhanced by input from the client 
group: it is partly for this reason that the Council was formed. The 
publicly-stated commitment of the government for public participation in the 
development and implementation of policy is also part of the rationale,for 
establishment of the Council with its particular mix of responsibilities and 
organizational structure. 56 
The Council's mandate clearly enhances the role of the Provincial 
Gerontologist. The terms of reference of this 'C' agency include: (I) assisting in 
adapting government programs, policies and institutions to accommodate the 
changing age structures of Manitoba's population; (2) increasing public knowledge 
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and understanding of the aging process and its implications for all age groups; (J) 
reviewing projects, programs, proposals and problems related to the aging 
process and the aging of Manitoba's population, as referred to it by the Minister; 
and ( 4) providing for a public consultative process through meetings with 
relevant organizations, groups and individuals. These terms can easily be seen as 
complementary to, and supportive of, the goals of the Provincial Gerontologist. 
It should be noted that all of the individuals with whom the role and function 
of the Council was discussed agreed that its primary focus was one of support to 
the Provincial Gerontologist and that it plays an advisory role to the Government 
and not one of advocacy, (although the distinction.between "advise" and 
"advocate" must surely be a fine one). The formal terms of reference cited 
above support that argument, although the Provincial Gerontologist did express 
some reservations about this view. She contends that the function of the Council 
is unique enough that it should not be viewed as merely an extension of her 
responsibilities. 
The membership structure of the Council is designed to ensure some 
continuity and could be interpreted to indicate some commitment to a Council 
which is on-going. Fifteen persons are appointed for a three-year term, with 
five members changing each year. The Chairperson is appointed for a two-year 
term, after serving a year as a regular member. As is the case with most other 
Manitoba quasi-independent agencies, the membership reflects geographic, 
ethnic, occupational, gender and related experience considerations. Council 
membership also reflects the age diversity of Manitoba, a factor which makes 
obvious sense for this body but which is not a criterion for membership selection 
to other Manitoba quasi-independent agencies. 
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Specifically, the geographic factor results in one member from each of the 
Norman, Thompson, Parl<lands, Central, Interlake and Eastman regions: two from 
the Westman region: and four from Winnipeg. This geographic spread ls 
considered to be of significant importance to the Council and ls adhered to quite 
firmly. This contrasts to the geographic representation on many other 
provincially-appointed bodies,' which is not usually so representative. While 
other boards may attempt to cover all regions, It is a goal not always realized. 
Efforts to incorporate representatives from various ethnic groups reveals 
one member who is a francaphone, another who is a Native Canadian and six 
others who reflect the ethnic diversity of Manitoba. These six others vary as to 
the groups which they represent but the two other most frequently represented 
are the Ukrainian and German'communities. 
The "occupational diversity" criterion shows that six members are chosen 
from among these groups: labour, small business, agriculture, nursing, medicine, 
clergy, architecture, law, skilled crafts, other health and social services and 
volunteers. All of these occupational categories. plus the volunteer category, 
have relevance to the issues facing today's aging. 
Although the Council's mandate concerns the aging, its membership 
structure deliberately avoids too great a concentration on the elderly. It has 
been established that no less than one-third but no more than one-half of the 
membership shall be retired individuals or senior citizens. In total, the 
membership is to span all adult age groups. The Provincial Gerontologist reports 
that they have never experienced any difficulty in recruiting interested 
individuals from any age group, including from the 20's. 
The final criterion used in the selection of individuals to be appointed to the 
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Council, is that all potential members must have an awareness of and interest in 
local community issues and the concerns of aging within all of Manitoba. In 
partial fulfillment of this requirement, three members are drawn from special 
seniors programs. These community programs are: the Manitoba Society of 
Seniors, the Age and Opportunity Centre and the Retired Teachers 
Organization. This last organization, although seemingly too specialized to be 
one of only three which are required to be represented on the Council, has 
traditionally played a leadership role on Issues and concerns of the aging which is 
continued and recognized by the mandatory inclusion of one of its members on 
the Council. 
The 15-member Council meets approximately seven times per year to 
discuss matters before it and to make decisions on regular ongoing business, such 
as development of the "Manitoba Senior. Citizens' Handbook" and co-ordination 
of the Annual Conference on Aging. The Handbook is intended as a guide to all 
of the programs and services available to seniors in the Province. It also 
provides advice on a variety of topics such as nutrition, safety, crime prevention. 
the wrjting of wills and other topics. 
The annual c~mference is a significant cross-Canada event in which the 
Council plays a major planning role. This gives the Manitoba Council an 
o~rtupity to meet with Its counterparts in other provinces. as well as 
continuing the ongoing liaison with other groups within the province. One of. the 
documents prepared for the conference is a 100 page compilation of statistical 
information on aging in Manitoba. It provides the socio-demographic factors 
necessary as a background to planning for the aged and an aging population used 
by other agencies as well as government. The research presented in this 
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document also covers such areas as: employment, income, health status, health 
care and health resources and the availability of informal support, and also 
significant background statistics required for planning. 
In fact, this document provides a clue as to the major goals of the 
conference; planning, testing ideas and preparing policy recommendations. Since 
the conference draws in people from all across Canada, its potential to be a 
valuable tool to government is significant. 
This function is not only a product of the annual conference but is a major 
responsibility of the Council as well. Its mandate for research and policy 
development is an ongoing responsibility as important as its objective of 
providing an informational resource to senior citizens in the province. 
The annual budget of the Council - approximately $62,400.00 is used largely 
for the production of the Handbook, while most of the remaining amount is used 
on research expenditures. The only staff of the Council is one administrative 
secretary. All other administrative, clerical and professional staff support is 
supplied by the Provincial Gerontologist's office, to the limited extent that such 
support can be made available. 
Since the Council reports through the Provincial Gerontologist who in turn 
reports to the Deputy Minister of the Department of Health, it may not be 
expected that there would be much interaction of the Council with the Minister 
of Health. However, the Minister has attended Council meetings when topics of 
special interest were on the agenda. The proposed increase in rates for personal 
home care use was a controversial decision, and the Minister wished to hear 
Council's discussion on the matter, rather than simply to receive a report of it 
later. The reverse situation has also occurred; that is, Council has requested the 
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Minister's attendance when a topic of special concern is under discussion. A 
recent example Is the Issue of elder abuse in Manitoba. In this case, the Minister 
conveyed the concerns of the Council to the Provincial Cabinet. and when more 
formal recommendations from Council were developed, they received approval 
from Cabinet. 
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Analvsis 
The characteristic of the Council to be reviewed first is its reporting 
relationship - through the Provincial Gerontologist, who reports to the Deputy 
Minister of Health, then to the Minister of Health, who is charged with 
responsibility for the Council on Aging. Although the Minister is accessible to 
the Council, the layers of reporting do represent a buffer between this particular 
special interest group, the aging, and the political arm of government. In 
particular, since the primary role and mission of the Provincial Gerontologist is 
to provide advice, consultation and information and to assist In the 
implementation of approved policy in the field, the Council cannot be viewed as 
an independent body. The Council functions much like any small research unit 
within the staffing and program responsibilities of a Branch Head - in this case 
the Provincial Gerontologist. 
An obvious reason for this relationship is that the inadequate funding of the 
Gerontologist's function requires that research be obtained from some other 
source. While obtaining such research from an inexpensive source is not without 
merit, the reality of her need for such support may undermine the independence 
of the research and the recommendations and advice which flow from that 
research. 
It should be emphasized that this reporting relationship is atypical of 
advisory bodies. In most cases, an advisory agency deals with the bureaucracy on 
administrative matters only and often reluctantly. Often, the only contact 
wanted is with the Minister or ministerial staff. Since independent advice is the 
reason for their creation, the matter of any contact with the bureaucracy 
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wh t . . t· 1 1 ·t· 57 a soever, is a par 1cu ar y sens1 ive one. 
Some of the aged population could argue that if the Council is to be most 
effective in its advisory capacity, surely greater distance from the bureaucracy. 
on non-administrative matters at least, is required. Administrative control by 
the bureaucracy may detract from the independence of an agency and; therefore, 
the fulfilment of their mandate, (although the same argument Is often put 
forward by departments). 
The participation of the Gerontologist, who Is a civil ser\tant, in the 
deliberations of the Council is quite likely to produce recommendations which 
are acceptable to the government. Even if the Gerontologist believes in a large 
degree of independence for the Council, her influence is not to be 
underestimated. She is a committed, knowledgeable individual who has a keen 
sense of what the government is likely to approve. · .' 
· . Only one instance of an "unacceptable" (to the Gerontologist) 
recommendation from the Council is reported. The Council wanted to propose to 
an NOP government that the provision of home care services and personal care 
homes be ·completely privatb:.ed. The Provincial Gerontologist was not in favour 
of the recommendation, but: it went forward to the Minister. Not surprisingly, it 
was not implemented. The Gerontologist states that nearly all other 
recommendations have been implemented and that those which have not, have 
not, because of budgetary restraints. The Government has indicated its 
concurrence with the recommendations however, and it does seem likely that 
they will be implemented over time. Based on experience to date, that belief is 
well-founded, provided that the recommendations continue to be acceptable to 
the government of the day. 
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It was pointed out that the role of the Council is not one of. advocacy, a 
: claim made by most agencies within this category. In this case, however. the 
; point was emphasized, indicating it is likely that the Council is satisfied with the 
.commitment of the Government and the pace of its action. 
This contrasts with the Advisory Council on the Status of Women who, for 
the most part, are uneasy with the pace and extent of change and are prone to 
suspect the Gov~rnment's commitment to and rationale for creating the 
Advisory Council. As such, they tend to be somewhat more vigorous in their 
~f:lrsuasion and a.dvocacy tactics with the Government. 
Aside from the recommendations and proposals made to the Government, 
. ' . ' . 
Coun_cil produces printed materials for the public. Their primary publication is 
the Manitoba Senior Citizens' Handbook, which is acknowledged as one of the 
most comprehensive produced by any of their co.unterparts in the other 
provinces. 58 The Handbook is well written and published in four languages -
English, French, Ukrainian and German. 
Although this d.ocument is an impressive example of what the Council can 
do, C()uncil's activities are severely restricted by the level of funding available. 
Inadequate funding is a problem not restricted to the Provincial Gerontologist; it 
.also extends to the. Council. Estimates planning for the fiscal year 1987-88 
include additional staff and financial resources for the Council and, these 
increases have been approved. 
The evidence that the Council is not as effective as it could be, is not 
confined to a quantitative assessment of their tangible outputs, such as 
publication of the Handbook. A very brief survey of senior citizens shows that 
the existence of the Council is not well known. 59 
- 110 -
Certainly, those senior citizens who were approached, did not view it as an 
independent body. Many of those who knew of it were not sure what it did. 
When the Manitoba Senior Citizens' Handbook was mentioned, most of those who 
were familiar with the Handbook saw it as a Government publication, not one of 
an independent body. 
Two of the responsibilities with which the Council is charged are identifying 
areas of opportunity for the Government through advice on programs, policies 
and institutions, and increasing public knowledge and understanding of the aging 
process. To do this well, significant out-reach into the community is required. 
Without it, only the interestedand active individuals who participate on the 
Council and with other related groups will be providing the in-put upon which the 
Council's recommendations are based. Although this is an inherent problem with 
any advisory body, it is particularly true of this one. 
The close relationship of the Council with the Provincial Gerontologist poses 
no difficulties from a purely administrative point of view. Since the Council is 
under the direction of the Gerontologist, it functions much like any branch of a 
government department. Even the interaction which does exist between the 
Council and the Minister is not atypical of that which would occur between a 
Minister and a branch of his or her department. Since many of the problems 
which occur with other agencies are the result of a lack of clarity on how a 
quasi-independent body is to relate to the bureaucracy, this set-up has the 
advantage of avoiding such potential problems. 
The Gerontologist sees no problems with this arrangement, understandably, 
since in effect it provides her with a much needed research unit. Curiously, the 
Council on Aging ls also very supportive of this close tie-in with the bureaucracy 
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and is only critical of their level of funding. 60 
tn their view, independence is not compromised, and in fact, since the 
Gerontologist is "on their side". the close relationship works to their advantage 
when the Government considers implementation of their recommendations. The 
possibility that the influence of the Gerontologist on the Council ensures the 
acceptabllity of their advice because the recommendations already reflect the 
Government's intent, is a point of view not accepted by the current Council • 
. ; . 
CHAPTER VI 
RECOMMENOA TIONS 
A number of recommendations have been developed as a direct result of the 
cases presented in this study. The process of interviewing individuals involved in 
these agencies (appointed members, staff and the client group), civil servants in 
staff and line departments, and aides in the Premier's and Ministers' offices, 
presented the opportunity to test ideas as well as learn new ones. To help keep 
the recommendations in perspective. the background and justification of each is 
provided. It should also be noted at this point, that the purpose of making 
recommendations is not to adopt completely a uniform approach to the 
treatment of agencies as a preferred model but'fo remain flexible and responsive 
to the individual needs of agencies and introduce uniformity only where it can be 
justified as an appropriate measure. 
These interviews also led to discussions about agencies which were not 
among those presented as case studies. Where recommendations were developed 
largely from information on other agencies, some background material and 
justification is provided following the recommendations. 
l. THAT A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BE DEVELOPED 
BETWEEN THE MINISTER RESPONSIBLE AND THE AGENCY HEAD 
WHICH CLARIFIES THE MANDA TE ANO PERFORMANCE 
EXPECTATIONS OF THE AGENCY AND DEFINES THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE AGENCY AND 
THE GOVERNMENT 
The purpose of such a document is to formalize the performance 
expectations not only as they relate to the meeting of the agency's 
- In-
mandate but also for accountability purposes. Reporting, accounting 
and other accountability requirements would be stipulated, and greater 
detail on the agency's powers and responsibilities would be included. As 
well, the document should indicate, as far as possible, the role of the 
Minister related to the issuance of direction to the agency. An 
advantage of placing these terms in a "Memorandum of Understanding" 
ls that such a document ls easier to amend than legislation. Keeping 
these conditions current is of primary importance. The document 
should be public information. 
The Memorandum should establish accountability through: 
a) the provision of Information on agency operations to the Minister 
responsible, on a timely basis and that suCh reporting explain and 
justify actions in full; 
b) establishment of a system of checks and balances which stipulates 
the extent to which the bureaucracy' ls Involved; 
c) a clear statement of the agency head's authorities which 
strengthens his or her responsibility for planning, administering and 
controlling the resources within his or her jurisdiction. 
2. THAT POLICIES APPLICABLE TO THE CIVIL SERVICE BE 
INDlV!DUALL V REVIEWED TO ASCERTAIN THEIR 
APPROPR!A TENESS TO AGENCIES 
These policies would include not only those affecting the direct 
expenditure of public funds but also those regarding the conduct of civil 
servants, such as Conflict of Interest Guidelines, the Affirmative 
Action Program and Workplace Safety and Health regulations. 
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3. THAT DRAFT LEGISLATION BE REVIEWED WITH SPECIFIC 
ATTENTION TO ITS ADMINISTRATIVE AFFECTS RESPECTING 
ACCOUNT ABILITY 
Some draft legislation was found to contain wording so vague that it 
is potentially problematic. For example, the draft Bill creating the 
Workplace Innovation Centre gave appointed members the right to 
reimbursement for "reasonable" out-of-pocket expenses. That 
provision gives no direction whatsoever on what is reasonable. who 
decides and how expenses are to be accounted for, nor how disputes on 
what is reasonable are to be resolved. 
4. THAT THERE BE A STANDARD EST ABUSHED FOR ALL ANNUAL 
REPORTS WHICH·WOULD ENSURE THE DISCLOSURE OF BASIC BUT 
COMPREHENSIVE INFORMATION TO THE PUBLIC 
Some Annual Reports were an embarrassment to review 
because of the lack of enough relevant information essential for a basic 
understanding of the agency. In some cases, the Annual Report is the 
only document on the agency made available to the public. Where 
agencies do not publish a separate report, the Annual Report of the 
department through which the agency reports should contain a section 
on the agency which covers all of the topics in a standard format. 
5. THAT INACTIVE OR REDUNDANT AGENCIES BE FORMALL V 
DlSEST ABUSHED 
Many interviews with departmental staff revealed the existence of 
agencies which had been non-operational for years. Because they have 
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never been formally disestablished, new departmental staff spend 
unnecessary hours determining the status of these bodies. In some 
cases, legislation requires that an agency must exist, but if that agency 
has outlived its purpose, the legislation should be amended. If its 
purpose is still valid, the agency should be required to fulfil its 
mandate, rather than remain inactive. 
6. THAT TERMS OF REFERENCE BE DEVELOPED FOR ONGOING 
FORMAL REVIEW OF AGENCIES 
Not one of the dozens of agencies (case studies or others) which 
were discussed as part of this study had a formal evaluation process; 
most did not even undertake informal, ad-hoc and internal review. 
Preferably, the review would be co-ordinated by a central management 
agency or an outside body, with participation by the agency under 
review, the "home" department. the client group and members of the 
Legislature, including Cabinet. 
1. THAT ADDITIONAL RESEARCH ON QUASI-INDEPENDENT BODIES 
BE CONDUCTED ON, FOR EXAMPLE, THE RELA T!ONSHIP OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE TO THE PURPOSE OF THE AGENCY 
Some agencies appear to have an organizational structure which is 
not appropriate to their purpose. For example. the Manitoba 
!ntercultural Council is structured in a manner similar to that of a 
self-governing body with the power to appoint its directors from within 
the membership and for example, to hire staff outside of the Civil 
Service Act; yet, the purpose of the agency is advisory in nature. 
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Likewise, the number of individuals appointed to agencies is usually 
an ad-hoc decision made without a well-researched basis. The result is 
that some agencies have an appointed board far too large to manage 
effectively the task before them. 
8. THAT THE ORIENT A TION AT PRESENT GIVEN TO NEW APPOINTEES 
TO AGENCIES BE CONTINUED AND ENHANCED • , : · 
Many agency appointees reported that they were not fully informed 
•• c 
of the requirements of their appointment. Although measures have 
been taken to correct this problem, this area requires much greater 
attention. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
The conclusions resulting from this study and contained in this chapter are 
of a general nature and do not necessarily lend themselves to the development of 
specific recommendations. Indeed, some of the observations to be noted here 
can only lead to the suggestion that further study is required. The purpose here 
is to offer comments which reveal attitudes, trends or practices, some of which 
have merit while others do not. 
The most pertinent observation to make is how much agency members differ 
in their perception of their own roles, from the notion held by the Ministers 
responsible, Cabinet as a whole and political and bureaucracy staff. Most agency 
members strongly stress their independence from government and tend to object 
to contact initiated by the Minister and the bureaucracy on the basis that it is 
"interference." This stance was noted in many agencies: the rationale for using 
the agency form seemed not to be of consequence to agency heads in their 
assertions that independence was necessary. 
It is understandable that an agency Board of Directors would be concerned 
about some kinds of interaction with the Minister if the primary purpose of using 
the agency form was to provide an impartial decision-making forum. A 
license-granting body is an example of an agency for which It is very appropriate 
· that its decision-making process (on the granting of licenses) be free of influence 
from government. Impartiality is important also from an "appearances" point of 
view. The agency must not only make impartial decisions but take measures to 
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avoid any impressions to the contrary. ln discussions with many individuals while 
conducting the research for this study, it was disturbing to discover how many 
appointed members were not sensitive to the implications of this rationale for 
creation of a quasi-independent body. 
The main point to be made here, however, is that regardless of a rationale 
which can give clues that suggest what measure of independence is appropriate, 
agencies argue that greater independence from government (than at present) is 
crucial to their operation. Analysis of the case studies reveals that this is 
sometimes an over-statement of their needs, or is not supported at all by the 
evidence of their own experience. That is, many agencies operated successfully 
with rather limited independence, even though they expressed a need for greater 
distance. 
On the other hand, it is equally alarming to hear Ministerial staff voice 
opinions which suggest a belief that agencies are a direct extension of the 
Minister's office. There is often an equal disregard for any balance of views 
between the two extremes, and this attitude tends to result in a "push-pulr 
relationship which is ultimately counter-productive. There have been cases in 
which the bureaucracy, particularly in its central management role, has not 
always been sensitive to the dynamics of this relationship. This means that since 
the greatest pressure on central management units comes from the elected arm 
of government, the activities affecting agencies tend to be limited to the "push" 
side of the relationship. Central management within the bureaucracy thus 
misses an opportunity to play a much needed balancing role. 
In addition, central management agencies are often guilty of not consulting 
sufficiently with the agencies over which they exert some control. This 
- 119 -
tendency only exacerbates poor communication. thus leading to measures which 
restrict agencies unduly or which do little to contribute to an accountability 
system because they are not based on an accurate understanding of the agency. 
The solution. however, may not be as simple as the oft-suggested one of 
"give managers the right to manage". This phrase is usually taken to mean that 
managers should be given greater decision-making authority, but be held to 
account for all decisions made. With agency heads arguing for greater freedom 
from administrative requirements, greater authority to make decisions only 
addresses one aspect of the issue. "Calling managers to account" is not specific 
enough. Accountability measures still need to be well-defined for agencies. 
One of the inherent problems in a large bureaucracy. is that managers (of 
agencies or any other administrative unit). are responsible for a relatively small 
part of the bureaucracy, and do not usually have the opportunity to experience 
some of the broader issues facing the Government. Managers can only 
reasonably be held accountable for their own areas of responsibility. The 
likelihood then, is that while they may have no difficulty in, for example 
justifying an increase in staff for their own responsibility areas, in no way could 
they be ·called to account for an overall growth in the staff size of the 
bureaucracy (including publicly-funded agencies) Vet. overall growth is a major, 
legitimate concern. How could accountability on this issue be effective if there 
is no centralized vetting of staffing requests. or directives on staffing restraints 
which are mandatory for agencies? 
Herein lies a problem significantly important for agencies. The fostering of 
an appreciation for the larger view is difficult enough in any case, but is even 
more so with agency heads. Many agencies are physically apart from other 
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· government offices, have distinct visual identity symbols. including letterhead 
which avoids any association with the Government, and have managers who 
would deliberately choose a private-sector service over one available to them 
from the bureaucracy (eg: those of the Queen's Printer). even when the 
private-sector service is more costly, simply to emphasize their separateness 
from government. The deliberate choice to stress distance works against 
fostering the "broader view". This aspect of agencies is a disappointing reality. 
This reaction is supported when the agency members interviewed for this study 
could only, for the most part, give weak responses to queries on why they should 
be; or are, independent. On the contrary, central management staff in the 
bureaucracy could give better reasons why agencies should at least be under 
greater scrutiny, if not greater direct control, (although these arguments were 
flawed because they revealed no appreciation of the need for some 
independence, in some or many matters). 
A way out of this problem is difficult to envision. But, practicalities aside 
for the moment, perhaps it could be useful for agency members and central 
management staff to participate in a staf( exchange program so that each could 
learn the needs of the other on a first-hand basis. Alternatively, the present 
orientation program for new agency appointees could be greatly enhanced, with 
the aim of fostering an understanding of the "broader view". A sister program 
would need to be developed for central management staff. 
While the preceeding observation on the differing points of view was 
reinforced by interviews with many individuals, it cannot be left without one 
caveat. The most successful Chief Executive Officers, General Managers and 
Executive Directors have recognized the dichotomy of views and have achieved a 
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balance between the two which works eKtremely well on an operational level. 
Many features of agencies seem to be arbitrary, making it difficult to assess 
their impact. Any evaluation must be based partly on a determination of how 
well certain measures have met their purposes; but when purposes are not stated, 
such a determination is not possible. Even simple characteristics such as the 
number of members appointed to an agency often have no rationale. Some 
appointed boards are very large in number, poS11ibly hampering effectiveness as 
working groups. Perhaps because there is poor co-ordination on organizational 
matters, many agencies make the same mistakes when they could have been 
avoided by learning from the experience of others. 
Most agencies look to their enabling statute for guidance on administrative 
authority, especially when such assistance Is lacking from other sources. The 
difficulty is that most statutes do not contain the degree of detail that is really 
sought by agency staff, members and others within the bureaucracy. Since it is 
not practical to put in legislation administrative detail which may need frequent 
updating, some other way must be developed to deal with this problem. 
The civil service bureaucracy is not usually credited with possessing much 
administrative or organizational innovation even in generous performance 
assessments, a particularly serious flaw concerning administrative arrangements 
with agencies which require great insight. Every attempt must be made to 
develop the most effective relationships -- those which provide the necessary 
flexibility, yet meet the highest accountability requirements. Memoranda of 
Understanding recommended in the previous chapter may be a first step in this 
process. Other measures could also be considered, such as a central agency 
function, of an advisory nature only, which could provide assistance to agencies 
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on organizational and administrative matters. 
One of the most important observations to make in this concluding chapter 
is that the most desirable administrative policy environment is one which is not 
static, so that the continually shifting factors which affect agencies can be 
responded to without hampering by inappropriate administrative constraints. 
This is not to suggest that administrative policies and procedures should not exist 
or be so open-ended as to be ineffective. aut the n.eed to develop a more 
consistent and well thought out approach towards agencies is great. Without a 
conceptual framework for viewing agencies. treatment will always be 
crisls-:0riented and ad-hoc. Without specific attention, an accountability 
network will not be in place to ensure adequate and fair scrutiny of public 
expenditure. One individual interviewed for this study, who had considerable 
cross-agency experience, stated that although agencies were not in crisis· 
(regarding accountability), the potential was certainly there. That view 
certainly supports an apparent trend in which agencies are "reined-in" and 
brought under greater ministerial control only when they get into serious 
difficulties. Until then, however, they may operate without a great deal of 
accounting for how and in what manner they expend public funds. 
The importance of a more co-ordinated effort regarding the administrative 
relationships of quasi-independent bodies is realized when long-range and 
strategic planning efforts of the Government are considered. It is difficult or 
impossible to implement the measures resulting from these efforts if 
administrative aspects relating to agencies are not addressed, because of an 
inappropriate assumption that such considerations belong solely within the realm 
of an agency head's decision-making authority. 
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Co-ordination is also necessary to ensure that rules and procedures which 
are mandatory for agencies continue to be relevant. These efforts must be 
on-going; there are no easy answers to the central concern posed by this study. 
Bureaucrats and agency people alike must exercise thought for all measures 
which affect agencies and avoid glib, highly structured, unrealistic, or overly 
global responses. The most acceptable framework within which to operate 
involves increased knowledge of agencies and of accountability needs and an 
exercise of the.responsibility for which civil servants are hired and agency 
members appointed. No administrative system can ever absolve these individuals 
of the need to think, analyze and provide the best response possible to a great 
variety of situations. Ultimately, there must be a realization·that there is no 
panacea. 
Finally, it must be re-stated that it is the Minister who is ultimately 
responsible for quasi-independent agencies, a responsibility which cannot be 
shifted when there are persistent problems with an agency. The accountability 
of the Minister may be more effectively achieved through reform in the 
Legislative Committee structure or in other aspects of the Legislature. 
Measures in this area, if dovetailed with changes in the administrative 
relationships of agencies, would go a long way towards creating effective 
apcountability. 
APPENDIX I 
ALPHABETICAL LISTING OF 
MANITOBA AGENCIES, BOARDS, COMMISSIONS, COMMITTEES 
AND CORPORATIONS 
AGENCY 
A.E. McKenzie Co. Ltd. 
Adv. Council to Licensed Practical Nurses 
Advisory Committee on Material and 
Child Health Care 
Advisory Committee on Multiculturalism 
Advisory Committee on School for the Deaf 
Advisory Committee on Tree Protection 
Advisory Council on the Status of Women 
Advisory Medical Board to Cancer Treat-
ment & Research Foundation 
Agricultural Credit Corp. 
Agricultural Crown Lands Advisory Cttee. 
Agricultural Employment Development Cttee. 
Agricultural Lands Protection Board 
Agricultural Productivity Council 
Agricultural Societies Advisory Board 
Alcoholism Foundation of Manitoba 
Apprenticeship & Trades Qualif. Bd. 
Arbitration Board of Forestry Branch 
Artificial Insemination Advisory Board 
Barbers Board of Examiners 
Board of the Assoc. of Occup. Therapists 
Beef Commission 
Board of Reference 
Board of Review 
Board of the County Court Judges 
Board of the Manitoba Dental Assoc. 
Boards of Arbitration 
Boards for Control of Interboundary Waters 
Boxing & Wrestling Commission 
Brandon Enterprise Development Centre 
Building Standards Board 
Canada/Manitoba Labour Market Needs Cttee. 
Cancer Treatment & Research Foundation 
Canteen Funds Board of Trustees 
Cattle Producers Association 
Centennial Centre Corp. 
Centre Culture! Franco-Manitobain 
Century Family Farms in Man. Sel. Cttee. 
Certificate Review Committee 
DEPARTMENT 
OR MINISTER 
Crown Investments 
Health 
Health 
Culture, Heritage & Recreation 
Education 
Agriculture 
Labour 
Health 
Agriculture 
Agriculture 
Agriculture 
. Agriculture 
Agriculture 
Agriculture 
Health 
Labour 
Natural Resources 
Agriculture 
Labour 
Health 
Agriculture 
Education 
Attorney-General 
Attorney-General 
Health 
Education 
Natural Resources 
Hon. L. Desjardins 
Industry, Trade & Technology 
Labour 
Employ. Serv. & Econ. Sec. 
Health 
Attorney-General 
Agriculture 
Business Develop. & Tourism 
Culture, Heritage & Recreation 
Agriculture 
Education 
AGENCY 
Channel Area Loggers Ltd. 
Child Welfare Review Board 
Child Welfare Treatment Panel 
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City of Wpg. - Committee on Environment 
Civic Service Board 
Civil Serv. Superannuation Invest. Cttee. 
Civil Service Commission 
Civil Service Superannuation Board 
Clean Environment Commission 
Co-operative Loans & Loans Guarantee Bd. 
Co-operative Promotion Board 
Collective Agreement Board 
Comite consultatlf des programmes d'ettude 
Comite consultatif en emersion francais 
Comite consultatif en francais 
langue premure 
Committee to Administer Police Benefit Fund 
Communities Economic Development Fund 
Conciliation Boards 
Conservation Districts Commission 
Council on Aging 
Credit Union Stabilization Fund Board 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Board 
Crop Insurance Corporation 
Crop Insurance Act Appeal Tribunal 
Cttee. on Pesticide Residue Testing 
Curriculum Policy Review Council 
Dairy Board 
Day Care Staff Qualifications Review Board 
Dental Mechanics Act Committee 
Denturists Act Committee 
Design Institute 
Oest. Manitoba Program Review Cttee. 
Disaster Assistance Board 
Documents Committee 
Drug Standards & Therapeutics 
Formularly Advisory Committee 
Ecological Reserves Advisory Committee 
Education Advisory Board 
Elections Finance Commission 
Electoral Divisions Boundary Comm. 
Electrician's Board of Examiners 
Elevator Board 
Embalmers and Funeral Directors 
Board of Administration 
Enterprise Manitoba Industry Sector 
· Advisory Boards (6) 
DEPARTMENT 
OR MINISTER 
Crown Investments 
Community Services 
Community Services 
Urban Affairs 
Municipal Affairs 
Hon. E. Kostyra 
Hon. E. Kostyra 
Hon. E. Kostyra 
Envir. & Workplace Safety & Health 
Co-operative Development 
Co-operative Development 
Education 
Education 
Culture, Heritage & Recreation 
Education 
Attorney-General 
Northern Affairs 
Labour 
Natural Resources 
Health 
Co-operative Development 
Attorney-General 
Agriculture 
Agriculture 
Agriculture 
Education 
Agriculture 
Community Services 
Health 
Health 
Business Dev. & Tourism 
Industry, Trade & Technology 
Government Services 
Culture, Heritage & Recreation 
Health 
Natural Resources 
Education 
Exec. Council & Legislation 
Exec. Council & Legislation 
Labour 
Labour 
Consumer & Corporate Affairs 
Industry, Trade & Technology 
AGENCY 
Environmental Assets Review Agency 
Environmental Council 
Evaluations Committee 
Farm Financial Review Board 
Farm Machinery Board 
Film Classification Appeal Board 
Film Classification Board 
Fire Department's Arbitration Board 
Fire Advisory Committee 
Flood Forecasting Committee 
Flyer Industries Ltd. 
Gas & Oil Fitters Board of Examiners 
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Gr. Wpg. Building Construction Wages Bd. 
Gr. Wpg. Gas Distribution Negotiating Ctte. 
Hairdressers Board of Examiners 
Health District Boards 
Health Research Council 
Health Sciences Centre Board 
Hospital Standards Committee 
Health Units Advisory Boards 
Hearing Aid Board 
Heavy Construction Wages Board 
Heritage Council 
Heritage Manitoba Board 
Highway Traffic Board 
Historic Sites Advisory Board 
Hog Income Insurance Plan Committee 
Horse Racing Commission 
Horticultural Societies Advisory Board 
Hospital Capital Financing Authority 
Human Rights Commission 
Industrial Inquiries Commission 
Insurance Licence Advisory Board 
Insurance Society Readjustment Committee 
Judicial Council 
Labour Management Review Committee 
Lake of the Woods Control Board 
Land Value Appraisal Commission 
Languages of Instruction Advisory Cttee. 
Law Enforcement Review Board 
Law Reform Commission 
Le Centre Culture! Franco-Manitobain 
Le Fonds de Securite des Caisses Populaire 
Leaf Rapids Town Properties 
Legal Aid Manitoba 
Legislative Assembly Management Comm. 
Library Federation Board 
DEPARTMENT 
OR MINISTER 
Envir. & Workplace Safety & Health 
Envir. & Workplace Safety & Health 
Education 
Agriculture 
Agriculture 
Culture, Heritage & Recreation 
Culture, Heritage & Recreation 
Labour 
Labour 
Natural Resources 
Crown Investments 
Labour 
Labour 
Energy & Mines 
Labour 
Health 
Health 
Health 
Health 
Health 
Health 
Labour 
Cultu·re, Heritage & Recreation 
Culture, Heritage & Recreation 
Highways & Transportation 
Culture. Heritage & Recreation 
Agriculture 
Business Dev. & Tourism 
Agriculture 
Finance 
Attorney-General 
Labour 
Attorney-General 
Attorney-General 
Attorney-General 
Labour 
Natural Resources 
Government Services 
Education 
Attorney-General 
Attorney-General 
Culture, Heritage & Recreation 
Co-operative Development 
Crown Investments 
Attorney-General 
Exec. Council & Legislation 
Culture, Heritage & Recreation 
AGENCY 
Licensing Advisory Committee 
License Suspension Appeal Board 
Licensing Authority 
Liquor Control Commission 
liquor Licensing Board 
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Local Government Districts Library Boards 
Lotteries Foundation 
Lower Red River Valley Water Commission 
Manitoba Arts Council 
Manitoba Data Services 
Manitoba Development Corp. 
Manitoba Energy Authority 
Manitoba Energy Council 
Manitoba Forestry Resources Ltd. 
Manitoba Health Services Commission 
Manitoba Housing & Renewal Corp. 
Manitoba Hydro · 
Manitoba lntercultural Council 
Manitoba Labour Board 
Manitoba Mineral Resources Ltd. 
Manitoba Oil & Gas Corp. 
Manitoba Public Insurance Corp. 
Manitoba Research Council 
Manitoba Securities Commission 
Manitoba Telephone System 
Manitoba Trading Corp. 
Manitoba Water Commission 
Manitoba-Northwest Territories Bound. Comm. 
Manitoba-Ontario Boundary Comm. 
Manitoba-Saskatchewan Boundary Comm. 
Market Sharing Quota Advisory Comm. 
Medical Review Arbitration Board 
Medical Review Committee 
Mental Health Planning Committee 
Mental Health Research Foundation 
Mental Health Research Foundation 
Milk Prices Review Committee 
Minimum Wages Board .. 
Mining Board ' 
Minister's Advisory Committee on 
Special Education 
Moose Lake Loggers Ltd. 
Motion Picture Proj. Board of Examiners 
Motor Transport Board 
Municipal Advisory Committee 
Municipal Assessment Court of Revision 
Municipal Audit Advisory Committee 
DEPARTMENT 
OR MINISTER 
Business Dev. & Tourism 
Highways & Transportation 
Industry, Trade & Technology 
Crown Investments 
Hon. R. Penner 
Culture, Heritage & Recreation 
Hon. J. Wasylycial-Leis 
Natural Resources 
Culture, Heritage & Recreation 
Crown Investments 
Business Develop. & Tourism 
Energy & Mines 
Energy & Mines 
Crown Investments 
Health 
Housing 
Crown Investments 
Culture, Heritage & Recreation 
Labour 
Crown Investments 
Crown Investments 
Crown Investments 
Industry, Trade & Technology 
Consumer & Corporate Affairs·. 
Crown Investments 
Industry, Trade & Technology 
Natural Resources 
Natural Resources 
Natural Resources 
Natural Resources 
Agriculture 
Education 
Highways & Transportation 
Health 
Health 
Health 
Agriculture 
Labour 
Energy & Mines 
Education 
Crown Investments 
Labour 
Highways & Transportation 
Municipal Affairs 
Municipal Affairs 
Municipal Affairs 
AGENCY 
Municipal Board 
Municipal Employees Benefits Board 
Museum of Man & Nature 
Nursing Review Committee 
Oil & Natural Gas Conservation Board 
Parole Board 
Pension Commission 
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Permanent Cttee. on Geographical Names 
Pesticides & Fertilizer Advisocy Cttee. 
Police Commission 
Prairie Provinces Water Board 
Producer Marketing Boards 
Chicken Broiler Producers' Marketing Bd. 
Egg Producers' Marketing Board 
Hog Producers' Marketing Board 
Honey Producers' Marketing Board 
Milk Producers' Marketing Board 
Turkey Producers' Marketing Board 
Vegetable Producers' Marketing Board 
Propane Gas Advisory Board 
Provincial Board of Health 
Psychiatric Nurses Educ. Adv. Cttee. 
Public Advisory Committee 
Public Library Advisory Board 
Public Schools Finance Board 
Public Utilities Board 
Rates Appeal Board - (M.P.I.C.) 
Rent Appeal Panel 
Rural Building Construction Wages Board 
Sanatorium Board of Manitoba 
Saskeram Wildlife Mgmt. Area Advisory Comm. 
School Buildings Projects Committee 
Sinking Fund Trustees - City of Winnipeg 
Small Business Int. Rate Relief Bd. 
Soc. Allow. Health Serv. Dental Rev. Cttee. 
Social Services Advisory Committee 
Souris River Water Commission 
Special Committee on Law Revision 
Standing Committee on Medical Manpower 
Student Aid Appeal Board 
Surface Rights Board 
Swine R.O.P. Advisory Committee 
Tantalum Mining Corp. 
Taxicab Boatd 
Teacher Certificate Appeal Committee 
Teachers Retire. Allow. Fd. Bd. lnves. Ct. 
DEPARTMENT 
OR MINISTER 
Municipal Affairs 
Municipal Affairs 
Culture. Heritage & Recreation 
Health 
Energy & Mines 
Community Services 
Labour 
Natural Resources 
Agriculture 
Attorney-General 
Natural Resources 
Agriculture 
Agriculture 
Agriculture 
Agriculture 
Agriculture 
Agriculture 
Agriculture 
Agriculture 
Energy & Mines 
Health 
Health 
Urban Affairs 
Culture, Heritage & Recreation 
Education 
Consumer & Corporate Affairs 
Hon. J. Bucklaschuk 
Housing 
Labour 
Health 
Natural Resources 
Education 
Urban Affairs 
Industry. Trade &. Technology 
Community Serv. & Corrections 
Employ. Serv. & Econ. Security 
Natural Resources 
Attorney-General 
Health 
Education 
Energy & Mines 
Agriculture 
Crown Investments 
Highways & Transportation 
Education 
Education 
AGENCV 
Teachers Retirement Allow. Fund Bd. 
Tourism Agreement Advisory Board 
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Tourism Agreement Management Committee 
Tourism Industry Organ. Advisory Cttee. 
Trade Advisory Committee 
Trout Lake Mine 
Uniform Law Conference of Canada 
Universities Grants Commission 
Venture Capital Advisory Board 
Venture Manitoba Tours Ltd. 
Veterinary Medical Board 
Veterinary Services Commission 
Victims Assistance Committee 
Water Services Board 
Weed Control Advisory Board 
Winnipeg Enterprise Development Cttee. 
Women's Institute Advisory Board 
Workers Compensation Board 
Workplace, Safety & Health Adv. Coun. 
DEPARTMENT 
OR MINISTER 
Education 
Business Develop. & Tourism 
Industry, Trade & Technology 
Business Develop. & Tourism 
Labour 
Crown Investments 
Attorney-General 
Education 
Business Develop. & Tourism 
Crown Investments 
Agriculture 
Agriculture 
Attorney-General 
Agriculture 
Agriculture 
Industry, Trade & Technology 
Agriculture 
Hon. H. Harapiak 
Envir. & Workplace Safety & Health 
APPENDIX ll 
AGENCIES UNDER THE JURISDICTION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
CROWN INVESTMENTS 
A. E. McKenzie Co. Ltd 
Channel Area Loggers Ltd. 
Communities Economic Development Fund 
Flyer Industries Ltd. (recently sold) 
Leaf Rapids Town Properties Ltd. 
Liquor Control Commission 
Manitoba Agricultural Credit Corporation 
Manitoba Crop Insurance Corporation 
Manitoba Data Services 
Manitoba Development Corporation 
Manitoba Forestry Resources Ltd. 
Manitoba Hydro 
Manitoba Mineral Resources Ltd. 
Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation 
Manitoba Oil and Gas Corporation 
Manitoba Telephone System 
Manitoba Trading Corporation 
Moose lake Loggers Ltd. 
Tantalum Mining Corporation 
Trout lake Mine 
Venture Manitoba Tours Ltd. 
Alcoholism Foundation of Manitoba 
Beef Commission 
APPENDIX Ill 
'A' AGENCIES 
Cancer Treatment and Research Foundation 
Centennial Centre Corporation 
Clean Environment Commission 
Health Services Commission 
Health Sciences Centre Board 
Horse Racing Commission 
Housing and Renewal Corporation 
Lotteries Foundation 
Manitoba Energy Authority 
Manitoba Research Council 
Mental Health Research Foundation 
Museum of Man and Nature 
Motor Transport Board 
Municipal Board 
Natural Products Marketing Council 
Public Schools Finance Board 
Public Utilities Board 
Sanatorium Board 
Securities Commission 
Water Services Board 
Workers Compensation Board 
NOTE: Not all of the agencies listed in Appendix I have been classified 
as an 'A'. 'B' or •c• agency. 
APPENDIX IV 
'B' AGENCIES 
Agricultural Crown Land Advisory Committee 
Agricultural Lands Protection Board 
Appeal Tribunal 
Apprenticeship and Trades Qualifications Board 
Board of Administration for Embalmers and Funeral Directors 
Board of Reference 
Board of Review 
City of Winnipeg - Committee on Environment 
Civic Service Board 
Civil Service Commission 
Civil Service Superannuation Board 
Civil Service Superannuation Fund Investment Committee 
Child Welfare Treatment Panel 
Collective Agreement Board 
Co-operative Loans and Loans Guarantee Board 
Co-operative Promotion Board 
Credit Union Stabilization Fund Board 
Crop Insurance Act 
Dental Mechanics Act Committee 
Ecological Reserves Advisory Committee 
Elections Finance Commission 
Farm Machinery Board 
Film Classification Board 
Hearing Aid Board 
Highway Traffic Board 
Hog Income Insurance Plan Committee 
Judicial Council 
Le Fonds de Securite des Caisses Populaire 
Land Value Appraisal Commission 
Legal Aid Manitoba 
License Suspension Appeal Board 
Liquor Control Commission 
Manitoba Box & Wrestling Commission 
Manitoba Energy Council 
Manitoba Design Institute 
Manitoba Disaster Assistance Board 
Manitoba Drug Standards & Therapeutics Formulary Advisory Committee 
Manitoba Human Rights Commission 
Manitoba Intercultural Council 
Manitoba Law Reform Commission 
Manitoba Police Commission 
Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation Rates Appeal Board 
Manitoba Water Commission 
Medical Review Committee 
Milk Prices Review Commission 
Motor Transport Board 
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Rent Appeal Panel 
Small Business Interest Rate Relief Board 
Social Allowances Health Services Dental Review Committee 
Social Services Advisory Committee 
Surface Rights Board 
Taxicab Board 
Teacher's Retirement Allowance Fund Boad 
Teachers' Retirement Allowances Fund Board Investment Committee 
Universities Grants Commission 
Veterinary Services Commission 
Veterinary Medical Board 
Workplace, Safety and Health Advisory Council 
APPENDIX V 
'C' AGENCIES 
Advisory Council on the Status of Women 
Advisory Medical Board to Cancer Treatment & Research Foundation 
Agricultural Employment Development Committee 
Agricultural Society Advisory Board 
Artificial Insemination Advisory Board 
Barbers Board of Examiners 
Building Standards Board 
Century Family Farms in Manitoba Selection Committee 
Conservation Districts Commission 
Curriculum Policy Review Council 
Dairy Board 
Destination Manitoba Program Review Committee 
Education Advisory Board 
Electrician's Board of Examiners 
Elevator Board 
Fire Advisory Committee 
Greater Winnipeg Building Construction Wages Board 
Gas and Oil Fitters Board of Examiners 
Hairdressers Board of Examiners 
Heavy Construction Wages Board 
Labour Management Review Committee 
Manitoba Council on Aging 
Minimum Wages Board 
Motion Picture Projectionist Board of Examiners 
Pension Commission 
Pesticides & Fertilizer Advisory Committee 
Producer Marketing Boards 
Provincial Board of Health 
Public Advisory Committee 
Rural Building Construction Wages Board 
Saskeram Wildlife Management Area Advisory Committee 
Tourism Agreement Advisory Board 
Tourism Industry Organization Advisory Committee 
Trade Advisory Committees 
Venture Capital Advisory Board 
FOOTNOTES 
I Agencies is a general term used to describe any committee, commission, board 
or corporation to which the government has appointed members and for which 
the government is ultimately responsible. It is used inter-changeably with quasi-
or semi-independent agency and non-departmental body. 
2Eichmanis, John, "Agencies, Boards and Commissions in Ontario: 
Accountability and Control". Legislative Research Service, Current Issue Paper 
tt22, Toronto, Ontario, April 1984. · 
:Srhere are many examples: Government Regulation Ontario Economic Councii, 
1987; Responsible Regulation Economic Council of Canada; Government 
Regulation Institute of Research for Public Policy; The Regulatory Process in 
Canada by Bruce G. Doem; The Politics of Regulation; A Reader by Samuel 
Krlslov and Lloyd D. Musolf; Reforming Regulation by Roger G. Noll; 
"Regulatory Agencies and the Canadian Political System" by Richard Schultz and 
Reforming Regulation Economic Council of Canada, (1981). 
4see studies conducted by the Law Reform Commission of Canada such as 
Political Control of Independent Administrative Agencies by Linda Vandervort: 
Independent Administrative Agencies Ottawa, 1980 and by the Manitoba Law 
Reform Commission; Report on Administrative Law Part I: Procedures of 
Provincial Government Agencies Report 1158, June 1984. 
5see "Uses of Legislative Committees" by J. R. Mallory, "The Influence of 
Standing Committees of Parliament on Government Legislation" by Paul G. 
Thomas and "Legislative Role of Parliamentary Committees in Canada; The Case 
of the Joint Committee on the Public Service Bills" by J. R. Mallory and B. A. 
Smith. 
6such works include: Ontario Manual of Administration, Volume I, Chapter 25; 
Manitoba's "Remuneration Study", 1982; Saskatchewan's three-tiered 
responsibility structure and the classification contained in the Federal Financial 
Administration Act. 
7see"Langford's article in Canadian Public Administration 25th Anniversary 
Issue. Winter, l 982. 
8ontario Manual of Administration, Volume r. Chapter 25. 
9This information was provided directly by an analyst in the former Bureau of 
Management Improvement, Department of Finance, Province of Saskatchewan. 
lO"Operation Productivity". staff of Management Committee of Cabinet, 1969. 
I !•Remuneration Study", staff of the Administrative Policy Branch. Manitoba 
Finance, 1982. 
121010. page 5. 
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1J1mo. 
141010, page 6. 
I 5c.o. Howe said this in response to a reporter's question. 
16Price Waterhouse Associates and The Canada Consulting Croup Inc., A Study 
of Management and Accountability in the Government of Ontario, January 1985. 
l 7see Hansard of the 4th Session, 32nd Legislature. especially pertaining to the 
Manitoba Lotteries Foundation. 
lBsee The Provincial Auditor's Act and the Provincial Auditor's Office Role and 
Mission Statement. 
19Report of the Provincial Auditor, 1984, page 53. 
201010, page 19. 
211010, page 54. 
221010 •. 
23staff of the Premier's Office provided this background. 
24The source for this information would not agree to be identified. 
25•Transfer Payments" may be defined as: "public money provided to a 
government agency, created by a Public Act, for the administration of a grant 
program on behalf of the government and whose.board members are all or mostly 
all appointed by the province." See the General Manual of Administration, policy 
subject number PA-11-06. 
' 
26Annual Report, 1983-84, Manitoba Lotteries Foundation, page 15. 
271010. pages 4-5. 
281010. 
291010. 
30This comment was made by the Foundation's General Manager, as justification 
for scrutinizing director's expenses more closely. The intent was to be more 
cautious about expenditures generally and is not the result of actual abuse. 
31Hansard in May and June of 1985. 
32The Manitoba Arts Council does not provide the Minister responsible with a 
copy of the minutes of its monthly meetings. 
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:BReforminq Regulation, 1981, Economic Council of Canada, page XI. 
}4The Labour Relations Act, Statutes of Manitoba, 1986, page l. 
:S5valerie Matthews Lemieux, a lawyer specializing in labour law who was 
central in rewriting the legislation and setting up the new Board for the 
Government. The comment was also supported by the Board's Chairperson. 
36staff of the Commission state that cases are simply assigned to investigative 
officers on a first-come, first-serve basis, but without on-going systematic 
monitoring to ensure that they are processed in a timely fashion. The point was 
made that as the legislation contained time-limits, a monitoring program would 
be quickly established, to ensure that cases did not drag on for over a year. 
37 Annual Report, page 7. 
301010. page 34. 
39cabinet was asked to deal with this issue, on at least three occasions; twice it 
was not approved but on the third attempt, remuneration was revised. There was 
also considerable lobbying involving members of the Cabinet, Board appointees 
and ministerial staff. 
40All historical information on the Council was provided by the Chairperson. 
41 The Chairperson and grant recipients supplied this information. 
42Annual Report, page B. 
43AU detailed information on the Council's programs was supplied by the 
Executive Director and from the Annual Report. 
44Executive Director. 
4518[0. 
46Manager. Program Development, Manitoba Labour. 
471010. 
401010. 
49The current Chairperson was told the commitment would be 2 days per week 
by Executive Council staff when he was considering acceptance of his proposed 
appointment. 
50An aide to the Minister. 
51 The Registrar gave this interpretation, but the Chairperson declined to 
describe it as "interference." 
- na-
52An aide to the Minister. 
53ouring research for the "Remuneration Study" names of advisory agencies 
re-emerged continually, even though some had not met for ten years or more. 
54Health officials claim that this body is nan-operative. 
55Manitoba Health, Annual Report, 1984, page 16. 
56An aide from the Premier's Office supplied this background on the Council. 
57rhe Advisory Council on the Status of Women provides a goad example of an 
agency which has expressed unease aver the requirement to deal with the 
bureaucracy. 
5BThis perhaps biased evaluation was offered by the Gerontologist. 
59rwelve senior citizens In a Fort Rouge apartment block were asked if they 
knew of the Council. 
60 A member of the Council. 
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INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED 
Ananichuk, Agnes, Manager, Program Development, Manitoba Labour. 
Angel, Barb., Chairperson, Manitoba Arts Council. 
Atwell, John, Chairperson; Manitoba Apprenticeship and Trades Qualifications 
Board. 
Deeter, Michael, Clerk of the Executive Council. 
Duff, Janet. Deputy Registrar, Manitoba Labour Board. 
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Goeres, Michael, Executive Director, Manitoba Intercultural Council. 
Havens, Betty, Provincial Gerontologist. 
Knight, Jeff, Senior Auditor, Provincial Auditor's Office. 
Maness, Garth, Executive Director, Manitoba Lotteries Foundation. 
Matthews Lemieux, Valerie, lawyer involved in the labour law review, drafting 
of the Labour Relations Act and in establishing the Manitoba Labour Board. 
Minish, Jean, Chairperson, Pension Commission. 
Mitchell, Annalea, Co-ordinator of the Premier's Secretariat. 
Neustaedter, Marlene;-Executive Director, Manitoba Arts Council. 
Rolfe, Lee, Communications Director, Winnipeg Chamber of Commerce (re: 
Labour Board). 
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